Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We find that the positive relation between aggregate accruals and one‐year‐ahead market returns documented in Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh [2009] is driven by discretionary accruals but not normal accruals. The return forecasting power of aggregate discretionary accruals is robust to choices of sample periods, return measurements, estimation methods, business condition and risk premium proxies, and accrual models used to isolate discretionary accruals. Our extensive analysis shows that aggregate discretionary accruals, in sharp contrast to aggregate normal accruals, contain little information about overall business conditions or aggregate cash flows and display little co‐movement with ICAPM‐motivated risk premium proxies. Our findings imply that aggregate discretionary accruals likely reflect aggregate fluctuations in earnings management, thereby favoring the behavioral explanation that managers time aggregate equity markets to report earnings.

ABSTRACT This analysis identifies a distinct immediate announcement period negative relation between earnings announcement surprises and aggregate market returns. Such a relation implies that market participants use earnings information in forming expectations about expected aggregate discount rates and, specifically, that good earnings news is associated with a positive shock to required returns. Consistent with this interpretation we find that Treasury bond rates and implied future inflation expectations respond directly to earnings news. We also find some evidence that the negative relation between earnings news and market return persists beyond the immediate announcement period, suggesting that market participants do not immediately fully impound these future market return implications of aggregate earnings news.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether there are systematic differences between the forecasting style and abilities of female and male analysts, and whether market participants recognize these differences. My key conjecture is that only female analysts with superior forecasting abilities enter the profession due to a perception of discrimination in the analyst labor market. Consistent with this conjecture, I find that female analysts issue bolder and more accurate forecasts and their accuracy is higher in market segments in which their concentration is lower. Further, the stock market participants are aware of the male–female skill differences. They respond more strongly to the forecast revisions by female analysts even though those analysts get less media coverage. The short‐term market reaction is incomplete, however, because it is followed by a strong post‐revision drift. The perception of abilities is similar in the analyst labor market, where female analysts are more likely to move up to high‐status brokerage firms, while their downward career mobility is lower. Collectively, these results indicate that female analysts have better‐than‐average skill due to self‐selection and market participants are at least partially able to recognize their superior abilities.

ABSTRACT We study the resource allocation role of voluntary disclosures when feedback from financial markets is potentially useful to managers in undertaking value maximizing actions. Managers weigh the short‐term price implications of disclosure against the long‐term efficiency gains due to feedback while financial analysts strategically produce information. The model can explain why managers disclose bad information (e.g., grim outlook), that reduces the stock price, and why prices respond more strongly to bad news relative to good news. We find that not all firms enjoy the same quality of feedback, and that feedback, by itself, does not induce more disclosure but less .

ABSTRACT Framed in the decision to restate financial statements, this study addresses whether behavior predicted by competing theories depends on the complexity of evidence. Two experiments observe the information‐search behavior of auditors responsible for investigating their firm's prior opinion. Experiment 1 shows that auditors confronted with few (many) summarized statements that replicate in form the materials used in prior research prefer to first search statements that are inconsistent (consistent) with the prior‐period accounting. This result generally corroborates research in accounting and confirms the predictions of information‐quantity theory in psychology. In contrast, experiment 1 also shows that, when materials mimic the detailed documents common in practice, the results are different: Auditors confronted either with few or with many detailed documents prefer to search inconsistent documents first. This result confirms the predictions of evidence‐complexity theory in psychology and shows that, compared to the materials on which prior research relies, detailed documents, such as memos, emails, letters, and analyses, drive information search toward inconsistent evidence. Experiment 2 probes further and finds that auditors evaluate documents bearing notes inscribed after the documents were prepared to be more inconsistent with the prior‐period accounting, and that the dispersion in search behavior may be reliably conditional on the presence of notes.

ABSTRACT Our paper examines whether audit quality is higher for industry audit specialists at the national and city‐office levels using the framework developed in Ferguson et al. [2003] and Francis et al. [2005] . We find that auditors who are both national and city‐specific industry specialists have clients with the lowest abnormal accruals, suggesting that joint national and city‐specific industry specialists have the highest audit quality. In addition, we find some evidence that abnormal accruals of firms audited by city‐industry specialists alone (without also being national specific industry specialists) are lower than those audited by nonindustry specialists. Using alternative measures of audit quality, we find that when the auditor is both a national and a city‐specific industry specialist, its clients are less likely to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts by one penny per share and more likely to be issued a going‐concern audit opinion. Together these results provide consistent evidence that audit quality is higher when the auditor is both a national and city‐specific industry specialist, suggesting that auditors' national positive network synergies and the individual auditors' deep industry knowledge at the office level are jointly important factors in delivering higher audit quality.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates contractual definitions of net income and net worth and the cross‐sectional variation in definitions of net income in a large sample of private debt contracts to shed light on the debt contracting demand for accounting numbers. The descriptive evidence indicates that removing transitory earnings is one principal concern in the measurement of earnings but not in the measurement of net worth. In the extreme, contracts are never written on comprehensive income as an earnings concept, whereas accumulated other comprehensive income is included in net worth in most contracts. In contrast, conservative adjustment, in the sense of including certain types of negative earnings but not the corresponding positive earnings, does not seem to be a primary consideration in measuring net income and net worth. Cross‐sectionally, I find that net income is more likely to be defined differently from the GAAP when net income plays a more important role in a contract, when the loan maturity is longer, and when transitory earnings are less useful for debt contracting. Collectively, the evidence shows that debt contracting parties choose contracting variables in a manner consistent with efficient contracting, and that transitory earnings are relatively less useful in measuring firm performance for debt contracting.

ABSTRACT Using a sample of over 5,000 debt issues, I test whether firms with more extensive use of covenants in their public debt contracts exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses in accounting earnings. Covenants govern the transfer of decision‐making and control rights from shareholders to bondholders when a company approaches financial distress and thereby limit managers’ abilities to expropriate bondholder wealth. Covenants are expected to constrain managerial opportunism, however, only if the accounting system recognizes economic losses in earnings in a timely fashion. Thus, the demand for timely loss recognition should increase with a contract's reliance on covenants. Consistent with this conjecture, I find evidence that reliance on covenants in public debt contracts is positively associated with the degree of timely loss recognition. I also find evidence that the presence of prior private debt mitigates this relationship.

ABSTRACT I investigate how the use and voluntary disclosure of synthetic leases is affected by incentives to defer cash outflows and manage the financial statements by keeping debt off the balance sheet. I find that managers of cash‐constrained firms with incentives to defer cash payments are more likely to finance asset purchases with synthetic leases. The mandated reporting for synthetic leases allows managers to avoid disclosing the financial consequences of these transactions. Managers of firms with incentives to use off‐balance‐sheet financing do not provide transparent disclosure about their synthetic leases. However, managers of cash‐constrained firms, which are less likely to use synthetic leases for financial reporting reasons, do voluntarily disclose the existence and financial consequences of these contracts. Alternative tests around FIN 46 adoption corroborate these findings.

ABSTRACT This study shows that firms collectively incur a cost for managing earnings and analyst expectations to meet earnings forecasts. We compare the coefficient in the regression of abnormal stock returns on earnings surprise (the earnings response coefficient [ERC]) across ranges of earnings surprises. The ERC for earnings surprises in the range [0, 1¢] is significantly lower than ERCs for earnings surprises in adjacent ranges for firm‐quarters in the early and mid 2000s, but not for those in the 1990s. The results are robust to controlling for the sign of estimated discretionary accruals and the trajectory of analyst earnings forecasts. We further find that investors are right to be skeptical about earnings surprises in the range [0, 1¢]. The relation of future earnings surprise with current earnings surprise is more negative for current earnings surprises in that range than for those in any other range. Evidence also suggests analysts react negatively to earnings surprises in that range.