Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT This paper examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the European Union on financial analysts’ information environment. To control for the effect of confounding concurrent events, we use a control sample of firms that had already voluntarily adopted IFRS at least two years prior to the mandatory adoption date. We find that analysts’ absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion decrease relative to this control sample only for those mandatory IFRS adopters domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS. Furthermore, for mandatory adopters domiciled in countries with both weak enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS, we find that forecast errors and dispersion decrease more for firms with stronger incentives for transparent financial reporting. These results highlight the important roles of enforcement regimes and firm‐level reporting incentives in determining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption.

ABSTRACT Investors, regulators, academics, and researchers all emphasize the importance of financial statement comparability. However, an empirical construct of comparability is typically not specified. In addition, little evidence exists on the benefits of comparability to users. This study attempts to fill these gaps by developing a measure of financial statement comparability. Empirically, this measure is positively related to analyst following and forecast accuracy, and negatively related to analysts? dispersion in earnings forecasts. These results suggest that financial statement comparability lowers the cost of acquiring information, and increases the overall quantity and quality of information available to analysts about the firm.

We examine the influence of normative and regulative institutional factors on cost shifting by nonprofit hospitals in their publicly reported statements. We explore whether normative constraints imposed by stakeholders, who prefer that nonprofit hospitals allocate their resources toward patient-related program services, influence the extent to which nonprofit hospitals shift costs toward program services and away from administrative and fundraising categories, thereby appearing more efficient. We also explore whether regulative factors, such as oversight, influence cost shifting behaviors. Results indicate that nonprofit hospitals facing higher normative pressures to demonstrate efficiency shift costs to a greater extent, and hospitals facing higher regulatory oversight shift costs to a lesser extent. Consistent with prior research, we also find that hospitals that obtain higher donations revenue shift costs to a greater extent. Our results show that, in addition to economic factors documented by prior literature, institutional factors also influence nonprofit hospitals’ cost shifting behaviors.

ABSTRACT This study examines the association between changes in reported financial performance resulting from mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and equity issuance during the transition period leading up to IFRS adoption for listed firms in Australia and Europe. We hypothesize that firms affected by the accounting standards change strategically time equity issuance around the time the firm discloses the effects of IFRS adoption on reported financial performance. We document circumstances where market returns are associated with the reconciliation of net income between local GAAP and IFRS. We find that a firm's likelihood of equity issuance and equity issue size during the three years prior to the IFRS reconciliation disclosure are negatively associated with the unexpected change in net income resulting from the conversion to IFRS.

Annual shareholder meetings provide an opportunity for shareholders to express their concerns with corporate performance, pressuring managers to demonstrate good performance. We show that managers respond to the shareholder pressure by reporting positive corporate news before the annual shareholder meetings. Specifically, we find significantly positive average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the 40 days before the annual meeting date. The premeeting returns are significantly higher when shareholder discontent with managerial performance is likely to be stronger. The decile of companies with the worst past stock price performance exhibits average CARs of 3.4% and buy-and-hold returns of 7.0% during the 40-day premeeting period. Companies with poor past performance exhibit even higher premeeting returns when shareholder pressure on management is greater, such as when institutional ownership is high, when CEO compensation is high, and when shareholders submit proxy proposals on corporate governance. We complement the evidence based on CARs by showing how managers of poorly performing firms manage the timing and content of earnings announcements and management forecast announcements before the annual shareholder meetings. Overall, the results suggest that managers attempt to influence shareholders before annual shareholder meetings through positive news.

ABSTRACT I analyze Embedded Value (EV) reporting by firms with life insurance operations to assess the impact of unregulated financial reporting on transparency and to examine the institutional characteristics that promote unregulated reporting. Under EV accounting, the present value of future cash flows from in‐force contracts is included in shareholders’ equity, and profit is calculated as the change in equity between two periods. In contrast to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), this approach produces higher shareholder's equity and recognizes income at contract inception. I find firms that adopt EV reporting exhibit a decline in information asymmetry, with the decline increasing as EV reporting evolves to address methodological deficiencies and to permit more comparability across firms. The decrease in information asymmetry is contingent on providing an audit certification, and larger for firms that commit to providing EV reports. Moreover, I document that EV reporting is more widespread in countries with more hostile takeovers, managers that do not avoid volatile income measures, regulators that are less likely to intervene in the product market, and analysts that believe EV disclosure increases the value of their information intermediation function.

Most corporate governance research focuses on the behavior of chief executive officers, board members, institutional shareholders, and other similar parties. Little research focuses on the impact of executives whose primary responsibility is to enforce and shape corporate governance inside the firm. This study examines the role of the general counsel (GC) in mitigating informed trading by corporate insiders. We find that insider trading profits and the predictive ability of insider trades for future operating performance are generally higher when insiders trade within firm-imposed restricted trade windows. However, when GC approval is required to execute a trade, insiders’ trading profits and the predictive ability of insider trades for future operating performance are substantively lower. Thus, when given the authority, it appears the GC can effectively limit the extent to which corporate insiders use their private information to extract rents from shareholders.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the economic impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by studying foreign firms? choice of whether to issue bonds in the U.S. public bond market or elsewhere before and after the law's enactment in 2002. After controlling for firm characteristics, bond features, home-country attributes, and market conditions, I find that foreign firms rely less on the U.S. public bond market after SOX. Additionally, some determinants of choosing the U.S. public bond market have changed since the passage of SOX: firms listing equities on U.S. stock exchanges, adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and doing large bond issuances are more likely to choose this market in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. Overall, these results are consistent with a shift in the expected costs and benefits of choosing the U.S. public bond market following SOX. This paper provides the first evidence about how SOX influences debt financing decisions and alters capital flows across international bond markets.

ABSTRACT The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has expressed concern about the informativeness of firms’ Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosures. A firm's MD&A is potentially uninformative if it does not change appreciably from the previous year after significant economic changes at the firm. We introduce a measure for narrative disclosure—the degree to which the MD&A differs from the previous disclosure—and provide three findings on the usefulness of MD&A disclosure. First, firms with larger economic changes modify the MD&A more than those with smaller economic changes. Second, the magnitude of stock price responses to 10‐K filings is positively associated with the MD&A modification score, but analyst earnings forecast revisions are unassociated with the score, suggesting that investors—but not analysts—use MD&A information. Finally, MD&A modification scores have declined in the past decade even as MD&A disclosures have become longer; the price reaction to MD&A modification scores has also weakened, suggesting a decline in MD&A usefulness.

Research in behavioral economics suggests that, in addition to their traditional incentive effects, formal control systems can influence psychological motivations. We extend this literature by demonstrating experimentally that formal controls directly influence people's sense of what behaviors are appropriate in the setting (personal norms), and indirectly alter people's tendency to conform to the behavior of those around them (descriptive norms). These effects persist even after the controls are changed, so that the effects of current controls can be strongly influenced by past control strength. Our results support those who are incorporating psychological factors into principal-agent models (such as Fischer and Huddart [2008]), and suggest that those models should be further modified to incorporate correlations between personal norms and conformity to descriptive norms.