Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We construct a novel measure of disclosure choice by firms. Our measure is computed using linguistic analysis of conference calls to identify whether a manager's response to an analyst question is a “non‐answer.” Using our measure, about 11% of analyst questions elicit non‐answers from managers, a rate that is stable over time and similar across industries. A useful feature of our measure is that it enables an examination of disclosure choice within a call. Analyst questions with a negative tone, greater uncertainty, greater complexity, or requests for greater detail are more likely to trigger non‐answers. We find performance‐related questions tend to be associated with non‐answers, and this association is weaker when performance news is favorable. We also find analyst questions about proprietary information are associated with non‐answers, and this association is stronger when firm competition is more intense.

ABSTRACT Basu's [“The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (1997): 3–37] measurement of conditional conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings underlies hundreds of studies. However, many subsequent studies cast doubt on the extent to which Basu's measure captures conditional conservatism versus statistical biases or alternative constructs (collectively, “biases”), thereby questioning the validity of the inferences that empirical researchers draw from analyses using the measure. We modify Basu's measure in four simple ways to remove these biases. Our key modification is the inclusion of interactive controls for return variance, a volatility proxy that captures Patatoukas and Thomas’ [“More Evidence of Bias in Differential Timeliness Estimates of Conditional Conservatism.” The Accounting Review 86 (2011): 1765–1794] return variance effect and various sources of economic optionality and adjustment costs. This inclusion captures volatility‐related effects on both the level of earnings and the sensitivity of earnings to returns, and it allows the magnitudes of these effects to vary with the sign of returns. We conduct validation analyses using placebo‐dependent variables, synthetic returns, and nonconditionally conservative earnings components that show our modified Basu measure is largely free of known biases. We further show that our measure is associated with contracting and other economic variables as predicted by theory. Our findings suggest that researchers can rely on our modified Basu measure to identify the determinants and effects of conditional conservatism.

ABSTRACT We exploit the staggered introduction of CPA Mobility provisions in the United States to study the effects of spatial licensing requirements on the labor market for accounting professionals. Specifically, we examine whether the removal of licensing‐induced geographic barriers affects CPA wages and employment levels, as well as the pricing and quality of professional services. We find that, subsequent to the adoption of CPA Mobility provisions, wages of accounting professionals decrease, whereas employment levels are unaffected. The documented wage effect stems from smaller CPA firms, is more pronounced for CPAs holding senior positions, and persists over time. We also find that service prices decline and that this effect is concentrated in local CPA firms. Moreover, we document that the increased wage and price pressure is not associated with deteriorating service quality. Collectively, our results suggest that the removal of occupational licensing barriers has sizable effects on labor supply and service prices. Our findings inform the current regulatory debate on occupational licensing.

ABSTRACT We use novel satellite data that track the number of cars in the parking lots of 92,668 stores for 71 publicly listed U.S. retailers to study the local information advantage of institutional investors. We establish car counts as a timely measure of store‐level performance and find that institutional investors adjust their holdings in response to the performance of local stores, and that these trades are profitable on average. These results suggest that local investors have an advantage when processing information about nearby operations. However, some institutional investors do not adjust for the quality of their local information and continue to rely on local signals even when they are poor predictors of firm performance and returns. This overreliance on poor local information is reduced for institutional investors with greater industry expertise and those with greater incentives to maximize short‐term trading profits.

ABSTRACT We study the effect of financial incentives on whistleblowing and the consequences for whistleblowers under the cash‐for‐information program of the False Claims Act (FCA). Exploiting appeals‐court decisions that increase financial incentives for whistleblowing, we find that greater incentives increase the number of lawsuits filed with the regulator, the regulator's investigation length, the percentage of intervened lawsuits, and the percentage of settled lawsuits. Using information from lawsuits, a professional networking site, and background checks for up to 1,168 whistleblowers, we find that whistleblowers’ long‐term annual income decreases by approximately 8.6% or $6,500 but do not find evidence of social costs. In comparison, whistleblowers can expect to receive approximately $140,000 for blowing the whistle. Overall, our results suggest that the FCA cash‐for‐information program helps expose corporate misconduct and helps compensate whistleblowers for their income loss.

ABSTRACT Does managing the production of information add value in economic environments where a manager may claim to be uninformed and withhold unfavorable news? We examine this question by nesting an optimal persuasion mechanism, controlling how evidence is organized, within a voluntary disclosure framework. Information has productive consequences because the firm uses it to make a continuous operating decision. The optimal reporting strategy features coarse information at the most unfavorable reported event if and only if the firm bears penalties for nondisclosure or positive disclosure costs. The model demonstrates the optimality of imprecise information over bad news in a voluntary disclosure environment, and that such imprecision increases the quality of public signals after considering strategic disclosure effects.

Abstract I reexamine whether media articles with substantive editorial content inform the market's reaction to firms' earnings news. Using variation in earnings announcement coverage because of restructuring at The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), my analyses suggest that WSJ earnings articles improve price discovery and increase trading volume at S&P 500 earnings announcements. Additionally, textual analysis suggests media articles that differ more from the firm's earnings release increase trading volume, and that the differences speed up (slow down) price discovery when they corroborate (contradict) the tone of the firm's news. Such high difference articles are slightly longer, are more readable and specific, include more references to the industry and economy, repeat less “stale” news published in previous WSJ articles, and quote more investor and expert sources. Overall, my paper contributes to research on the role of the media in earnings news by providing evidence that journalists' editorial content helps investors understand firms' earnings, instead of simply entertaining or increasing awareness.

ABSTRACT This paper provides early evidence on the effect of global regulation mandating a switch from loan loss provisioning (LLP) based on incurred credit losses (ICLs) to LLP based on expected credit losses (ECLs). Using a sample of systemically important banks from 74 countries, we find that ECL provisions are more predictive of future bank risk than ICL provisions. Corroborating that the switch to ECL provisioning results in more information to assess bank risk, we also observe that the announcement of a larger first‐time impact of the accounting change elicits lower stock returns and higher changes in credit default swap spreads. Critically, these patterns are most pronounced when credit conditions deteriorate. Additional analyses show that the higher information content of the ECL model stems from the provisions for nondefaulted loans, which did not exist under ICL. Our study contributes to the debate on the effect of the ECL model on procyclicality, an especially pressing issue in the context of the current pandemic.

ABSTRACT The SEC prohibits the presentation of non‐GAAP measures before corresponding GAAP measures; however, a large proportion of non‐GAAP reporters present non‐GAAP EPS before GAAP EPS in their earnings announcements. This noncompliance raises questions about whether firms use prominence to highlight higher or lower quality non‐GAAP information. For firms reporting non‐GAAP EPS between 2003 and 2016, prominent non‐GAAP EPS is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting. Further tests reveal that nonregulatory incentives, rather than regulatory costs, explain this relation. Specifically, prominence is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting in settings where prominence is not regulated, investors ignore prominence when non‐GAAP reporting quality is lower, and the minority of firms using prominence to mislead exhibit characteristics associated with weaker investor monitoring. Overall, we provide evidence that regulatory noncompliance can reflect an intent to inform, and that most firms use prominence to highlight higher quality non‐GAAP information despite prohibitive regulation.

ABSTRACT Crowdsourced financial information platforms often allow content contributors to publish equity research anonymously. This study examines whether investors value or discount information in anonymous equity research. In the short window around research releases, we find that investors’ stock price reaction to anonymous research is muted in comparison to nonanonymous research. Consistent with credibility concerns influencing investor response, we document that this discount to anonymous research dissipates as the monitoring of content contributors intensifies and as authors develop a reputation for high‐quality reporting. In addition, we perform a content analysis on the research reports and find that the muted market reaction to anonymous equity research is robust to controlling for textual attributes of information content, further supporting our inference that investors’ are concerned about the credibility of anonymous equity research.