Knowledge that Transforms

This paper investigates whether private information from lending activities improves the forecast accuracy of bank-affiliated analysts. Using a matched sample design, matching by affiliated bank or borrower, we demonstrate that the forecast accuracy of bank-affiliated analysts increases after the followed firm borrows from the affiliated bank. We also find that the increase in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for borrowers with greater information asymmetry and bad news, and for deals with financial covenants. Last, we find that the informational advantage of bank-affiliated analysts exists only when the affiliated banks serve as lead arrangers, not merely as participating lenders. Overall, our evidence suggests that information flows from commercial banking to equity research divisions within financial conglomerates.

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All-Star” recognition, investment-banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All-Star” recognition proxies for buy-side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment-banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high-status bank and obtain similar results.

We examine whether management earnings forecast errors exhibit serial correlation and how analysts understand the serial correlation property of management forecast errors (MFEs). MFEs should not exhibit serial correlation if managers efficiently process information in prior forecast errors and truthfully convey their earnings expectations through management forecasts. However, for long-horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, we find significantly positive serial correlation in MFEs, and sample self-selection does not seem to drive this phenomenon. Further analyses suggest that managers’ unintentional information processing bias contributes to this positive serial correlation. Analysts anticipate the intertemporal persistence of MFEs but underestimate the persistence level when reacting to management forecasts. Our findings have implications for market participants who rely on management forecasts to form earnings expectations, and also shed light on the efficiency of managerial decision making.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the effect of vivid language on investor judgments. Recent research finds that investor judgments are significantly influenced by disclosure tone (positive versus negative). Holding tone constant, we investigate investors’ reactions to vivid versus pallid information. Drawing on theories from psychology, we predict that investors will be sensitive to the differences between vivid and pallid language when the underlying information is preference inconsistent, but not when the information is preference consistent. Results of two experiments support our prediction. Vivid language significantly influences the judgment of investors who hold contrarian positions (i.e., short investors in a bull market and long investors in a bear market). Interestingly, vivid language has limited influence on the judgment of investors who hold positions consistent with the general tenor of the market. Our results provide evidence regarding when vividness matters and when it does not in financial contexts, thereby contributing to both psychology and a growing literature on disclosure tone in financial reporting. In addition, our results also speak to concerns raised by regulators and academics asserting that vivid language can inflate bubbles and incite panics.

I find that executives’ unvested equity holdings are larger when executives are employed by R&D-intensive firms in industries that rely more on secrecy to profit from R&D. Moreover, I find that this relation is more pronounced for executives with a greater ability to exploit R&D-related information and also holds for nonexecutive employees. In addition, I find that these firms use option grants with longer vesting periods and that unvested equity holdings reduce the likelihood that their executives leave to find employment elsewhere. Overall, my findings are consistent with firms using time-vested stock-based pay to reduce the leakage of R&D-related information to competitors through employee mobility.

This study investigates how accounting harmonization affects one particular group of financial statement users—financial analysts. We find that mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption attracts foreign analysts, particularly those from countries that are simultaneously adopting IFRS along with the covered firm's country and those with prior IFRS experience. We also find that mandatory IFRS adoption improves foreign analysts’ forecast accuracy. The change in analyst following increases with the distance between prior local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and IFRS and with the extent to which IFRS adoption eliminates GAAP differences between the firm's country and the analyst's country. IFRS adoption also attracts more local analysts, particularly those with prior IFRS experience and with an international portfolio prior to mandated IFRS adoption in their home country. Local analysts’ forecast accuracy is not affected by IFRS adoption. Overall, our results suggest that accounting harmonization brings comparability benefits that enhance the usefulness of accounting data.

We extend standard models of conditional earnings conservatism and adaptation value to the context of the corporate refocusing activities of UK listed companies. This analysis is interesting because refocusing activities are: (1) commonly anticipated by significant negative returns in the financial year(s) before the refocusing event; (2) typically associated with large material charges; and (3) likely to be part of a strategic plan with the internal decision preceding the formal public announcement. We complement Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] by showing how their nonlinear relation between share prices and earnings changes around refocusing events as adaptation options are exercised. Because refocusing events also involve large realized losses and major changes to firms’ strategic plans, we expect to see systematic changes in the timing relations between stock returns and reported earnings. To capture this, we show how the coefficients of Basu's [1997] model of conditional conservatism change around refocusing events.

The PCAOB recently expressed concern regarding the sufficiency and effectiveness of review and supervision of audit fieldwork. For the audit review process to succeed as a quality control mechanism, any issues or questions identified by a reviewer must be adequately resolved and documented in the workpapers. If audit review fails to correct for errors/biases in the work of reviewees, there can be serious detrimental effects on audit quality and, in turn, financial statement quality. Our study extends the literature by examining the phase of the review process in which reviewees respond to (or “close”) notes/comments provided by their reviewers. Utilizing an experiment, we find that certain contextual factors (review timeliness and review note frame) influence reviewee follow-through during this critical phase. Specifically, we find that a delayed review elicits significantly lower effort levels than a timely review. Review note frame (i.e., how the reviewer phrases the rationale given for the underlying directive of a review note) significantly affects reviewee effort and performance when the review is timely. Through mediation analyses, we explore the mediating effect of effort on performance. In addition, we find that reviewer delay leads to greater over-documentation.

ABSTRACT This paper examines when information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. When equity markets are perfectly competitive, information asymmetry has no separate effect on the cost of capital. When markets are imperfect, information asymmetry can have a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital. Consistent with our prediction, we find that information asymmetry has a positive relation with firms’ cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors when markets are imperfect and no relation when markets approximate perfect competition. Overall, our results show that the degree of market competition is an important conditioning variable to consider when examining the relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital.

ABSTRACT We use incremental and joint implementation of multiple SOX‐based control effectiveness disclosure and audit mandates to assess relative performance of alternatives for small U.S. public companies. Using data from several low‐ and high‐effort management disclosure and audit regimes implemented from 2003 to 2008, we find substantial and statistically significant increases in material weakness disclosure rates for small firms undergoing initial SOX 404(b) internal control audits, but find quantitatively and statistically similar increases for initial management reports of small firms exempt from such audits. As to audit cost, fees more than double for initial 404(b) audits in 2004 and remain high, while 404(b)‐exempt firms’ fees grow about 10% annually. Our results support the view that, for small firms, management internal control reports and traditional financial audits may be a cost effective disclosure alternative to full application of SOX 404(b). Also, our results suggest that, even without management reports on internal control, analysis of the cause of known accounting mistakes may yield substantial material weakness disclosures.