Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We find that lower ex ante earnings volatility leads to higher Post–Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD). PEAD is a function of both the magnitude of an earnings surprise and its persistence. While prior research has largely investigated market reactions to the magnitude of the earnings surprise, in this study we show that the persistence of the earnings surprise is equally important. A unique feature of the anomalous PEAD returns documented here concerns the association between abnormal returns and trading frictions. Besides demonstrating that firms with lower earnings volatility have higher abnormal returns, we also find that lower earnings volatility firms have lower trading frictions. Taken together, these findings imply that higher abnormal returns are associated with lower trading frictions. We exploit this implication to empirically demonstrate that PEAD returns due to earnings volatility are not concentrated in the firms with the largest trading frictions, which is in contrast to the findings in prior anomaly studies.

ABSTRACT Theories from the economics, management control, and organizational behavior literatures predict that when it is difficult to align incentives by contracting on output, aligning preferences via employee selection may provide a useful alternative. This study investigates this idea empirically using personnel and lending data from a financial services organization that implemented a highly decentralized business model. I exploit variation in this organization in whether or not employees are selected via channels that are likely to sort on the alignment of their preferences with organizational objectives. I find that employees selected through such channels are more likely to use decision‐making authority in the granting and structuring of consumer loans than those who are not. Conditional on using decision‐making authority, their decisions are also less risky ex post. These findings demonstrate employee selection as an important, but understudied, element of organizational control systems.

ABSTRACT Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self‐dealing. There are, however, possible benefits to these arrangements for outside shareholders. We find that the overall volume of disclosed RPTs is generally not significantly associated with shareholder wealth as measured by operating profitability or Tobin's Q. However, the results for total RPT volume obscure that ex ante RPTs, transactions that predate a counterparty becoming a related party, are innocuous at worst in terms of their association with operating profitability and significantly positively associated with Tobin's Q whereas ex post RPTs, transactions initiated after a counterparty becomes a related party, are significantly negatively associated with operating profitability. Ex post RPTs also result in significant share price declines when first disclosed and are associated with an increased likelihood that a firm will enter financial distress or deregister its securities. These results are consistent with ex post RPTs serving as means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders.

ABSTRACT This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.

ABSTRACT In deciding how much information about their firms’ customers to disclose, managers face a trade off between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry with capital market participants and the costs of aiding competitors by revealing proprietary information. This paper investigates the determinants of managers’ choices to disclose information about their firms’ customers using a comprehensive data set of customer‐information disclosures over the period 1976–2006. We find robust evidence in support of the hypothesis that proprietary costs are an important factor in firms’ disclosure choices regarding information about large customers.

ABSTRACT We estimate linguistic‐based classification models of deceptive discussions during quarterly earnings conference calls. Using data on subsequent financial restatements and a set of criteria to identify severity of accounting problems, we label each call as “truthful” or “deceptive.” Prediction models are then developed with the word categories that have been shown by previous psychological and linguistic research to be related to deception. We find that the out‐of‐sample performance of models based on CEO and/or CFO narratives is significantly better than a random guess by 6–16% and is at least equivalent to models based on financial and accounting variables. The language of deceptive executives exhibits more references to general knowledge, fewer nonextreme positive emotions, and fewer references to shareholder value. In addition, deceptive CEOs use significantly more extreme positive emotion and fewer anxiety words. Finally, a portfolio formed from firms with the highest deception scores from CFO narratives produces an annualized alpha of between −4% and −11%.

ABSTRACT We study a model in which managers’ disclosure and investment decisions are both endogenous and managers can manipulate their voluntary reports through (suboptimal) investment, financing, or operating decisions. Managers are privately informed about the value of their firm and have incentives to voluntarily disclose information and manipulate their reports in order to obtain more favorable terms when issuing equity to finance a new profitable investment opportunity. The model shows that treating managers’ disclosure and investment decisions both as endogenous and allowing managers to manipulate their voluntary reports yields qualitatively different predictions from when the disclosure and investment decisions are considered separately and managers cannot engage in manipulation. The model predicts that managers’ disclosure strategy is sometimes characterized by two distinct nondisclosure intervals (contrary to traditional threshold equilibria of voluntary disclosure models) and that managers with intermediate news sometimes forego the new profitable investment opportunity. As such, the paper highlights the importance of considering the interdependencies between firms’ disclosure and investment decisions and provides new empirical predictions.

ABSTRACT We study determinants of internal control reporting decisions under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX 404) using a sample of restating firms whose original misstatements are linked to underlying control weaknesses. We find that only a minority of these firms acknowledge their existing control weaknesses during their misstatement periods, and that this proportion has declined over time. Further, the probability of reporting existing weaknesses is negatively associated with external capital needs, firm size, non‐audit fees, and the presence of a large audit firm; it is positively associated with financial distress, auditor effort, previously reported control weaknesses and restatements, and recent auditor and management changes. These results provide evidence that detection and disclosure incentives play a role in whether existing material weaknesses are reported, which has implications for the effectiveness of SOX 404 in providing investors with advance warning of potential accounting problems.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether gubernatorial elections affect state governments’ accounting choices. We identify two accounts, the compensated absence liability account and the unfunded pension liability account, which provide incumbent gubernatorial candidates with flexibility for manipulation. We find that, in an election year, the liability associated with compensated absences and unfunded pension liabilities are both systematically lower. We also find that the variation in these employment‐related liabilities is correlated with proxies for the incumbent's incentives and ability to manipulate their accounting reports. Jointly, these results suggest that state governments manipulate accounting numbers to present a healthier financial picture in an election year.

ABSTRACT Building on contract theory, we argue that financial covenants control the conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers via two different mechanisms. Capital covenants control agency problems by aligning debt holder–shareholder interests. Performance covenants serve as trip wires that limit agency problems via the transfer of control to lenders in states where the value of their claim is at risk. Companies trade off these mechanisms. Capital covenants impose costly restrictions on the capital structure, while performance covenants require contractible accounting information to be available. Consistent with these arguments, we find that the use of performance covenants relative to capital covenants is positively associated with (1) the financial constraints of the borrower, (2) the extent to which accounting information portrays credit risk, (3) the likelihood of contract renegotiation, and (4) the presence of contractual restrictions on managerial actions. Our findings suggest that accounting‐based covenants can improve contracting efficiency in two different ways.