Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT This paper decomposes the cash component of earnings and analyzes persistence characteristics and pricing implications of various subcomponents, with particular attention to changes in cash. Changes in underlying fundamentals might dictate changes in cash to new optimal levels. Alternatively, suboptimal changes in cash might result from agency costs allowing managers’ actions to diverge from the best interests of shareholders. We predict and find that both suboptimal increases and decreases in cash bode poorly for future earnings. In fact, we find that suboptimal increases (decreases) in cash have less (greater) persistence than any of the earnings components we study, including accruals and net distributions to both shareholders and debt holders. Market efficiency tests indicate that the market severely punishes firms with suboptimal decreases in cash, but we find no evidence to support the hubris hypothesis that the market overreacts to the earnings implications of unwarranted increases in cash.

ABSTRACT Between 2000 and 2003 a series of disclosure and analyst regulations curbing abusive financial reporting and analyst behavior were enacted to strengthen the information environment of U.S. capital markets. We investigate whether these regulations reduced security mispricing and increased stock market efficiency. After the regulations, we find a significant reduction in short‐term stock price continuation following analyst forecast revisions and earnings announcements. The effect was more pronounced among higher information uncertainty firms, where we expect security valuation to be most sensitive to regulation. Analyst forecast accuracy also improved in these firms, consistent with reduced mispricing being due to an improved corporate information environment following the regulations. Our findings are robust to controls for time trends, trading activity, the financial crisis, analyst coverage, delistings, and changes in information uncertainty proxies. We find no concurrent effect among European firms and a regression discontinuity design supports our identification of a regulatory effect.

ABSTRACT This paper proposes that psychological factors can change managers' beliefs about earnings management when they choose to engage in it. I show that, under certain circumstances, engaging in a small amount of earnings management alters a manager's beliefs about the appropriateness of the act, which may increase the likelihood of further earnings management. Specifically, I predict and find in two experiments that participants who initially choose to manage earnings are motivated to rationalize their behavior. Participants who are exposed to an egregious example of earnings management (commonly the focus of enforcement actions and press reports) have the opportunity to rationalize their behavior through a mechanism called “advantageous comparison,” where participants compare their behavior against the egregious example and conclude that what they did was relatively innocuous and appropriate. My analysis also indicates that presenting participants with an example of earnings management that is similar to the initial decision they made mitigates advantageous comparison. These results have implications for academics interested in how earnings management, and perhaps fraud, can accrete over time and for regulators and practitioners who are interested in preventing it.

ABSTRACT We posit that management forecasts, which are predictable transformations of realized earnings without random errors, are more informative than unbiased forecasts, which manifest small but unpredictable errors, even if biased forecasts are less accurate. Consistent with this intuition, we find that managers who make consistent forecasting errors have a greater ability to influence investor reactions and analyst revisions, even after controlling for the effect of accuracy. This effect is more economically significant and statistically robust than that of forecast accuracy. More sophisticated investors and experienced analysts are found to have a better understanding of the benefits of consistent management forecasts.

ABSTRACT We develop a cost–benefit tradeoff that provides new insights into the frequency with which firms should be required to report the results of their operations to the capital market. The benefit to increasing the frequency of financial reporting is that it causes market prices to better deter investments in negative net present value projects. The cost of increased frequency is that it increases the probability of inducing managerial short‐termism. We analyze the tradeoff between these costs and benefits and develop conditions under which greater reporting frequency is desirable and conditions under which it is not.

ABSTRACT Although sell‐side analysts often privately interact with managers of publicly traded firms, the private nature of this contact has historically obscured direction examination. By examining a set of proprietary records compiled by a large‐cap NYSE‐traded firm, I offer insights into which analysts privately meet with management, when analysts privately interact with management, and why these interactions occur. I also compare private interaction to public interaction between analysts and managers on conference calls. The evidence suggests that private interaction with management is an important communication channel for analysts for reasons other than firm‐specific forecasting news.

ABSTRACT We document that a stock's price around a recommendation or forecast covaries with prices of other stocks the issuing analyst covers. The effect of shared analyst coverage on stock price comovement extends beyond analyst activity days. A stock's daily returns covary with the returns of other stocks with which it shares analyst coverage. These links between stock price comovement and shared analyst coverage are consistent with the coverage‐specific information we find in earnings forecasts; analysts who cover both stocks in a pair expect future earnings of the stocks to be more highly correlated than do analysts who cover only one stock from the pair. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analyst research produces coverage‐specific spillovers that raise price comovement among stocks that share analyst coverage. The strength of these spillovers is comparable to spillovers from broad industry and market information in analyst research.

ABSTRACT The use of observed transaction sizes to differentiate between “small” and “large” investor trading patterns is widespread. A significant concern in such studies is spurious effects attributable to misclassification of transactions, particularly those originating from large investors. Such effects can arise unintentionally, strategically, or endogenously. We examine comprehensive records of a sample of institutional investors (i.e., “large” traders), including their order sizes and overall position changes, to assess the degree to which such misclassifications give rise to spurious inferences about “small” and “large” investor trading activities. Our analysis shows that these institutions are heavily involved in small transaction activity. It also shows that they increase their order sizes substantially in announcement periods relative to nonannouncement periods, presumably as an endogenous response to earnings news. In the immediate earnings announcement period, transaction size‐based inferences about directional trading are quite misleading—producing spurious “small trader” effects and, more surprisingly, erroneous inferences about “large trader” activity.

ABSTRACT We study the economic consequences of a recent Securities and Exchange Commission securities regulation change that grants foreign firms trading on the U.S. over‐the‐counter (OTC) market an automatic exemption from the reporting requirements of the 1934 Securities Act. We document that the number of voluntary (sponsored) OTC cross‐listings did not increase following the regulation change, suggesting that it did not achieve its intended purpose of increasing voluntary OTC cross‐listings through a reduction in compliance costs. We do find that the design of the regulation allowed financial intermediaries to create an unprecedented number of involuntary (unsponsored) OTC ADRs: 1,700 unsponsored ADR programs for 920 firms were created for companies that had previously chosen not to cross‐list in the United States. Our difference‐in‐differences analysis based on a matched sample approach documents that foreign firms forced into the U.S. capital markets experience a significant decrease in firm value, and we further show that the decrease in firm value is related to an increase in U.S. litigation risk. We also find that depositary banks’ propensity to involuntarily cross‐list firms is positively related to banks’ expected fee revenue, and that banks chose firms that incur high costs when involuntarily cross‐listed. Our results provide evidence that securities regulation can be exploited for private gain and result in costly unintended consequences.