Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT This registered report investigates self‐directed retail investors' information choices and trading decisions on an integrated trading platform that provides timely and convenient access to accounting information. The analyses reveal that these investors access a mosaic of information, with a high proportion not firm‐specific. In accessing accounting disclosures, retail investors are more interested in media articles providing summaries or expert analyses than original filings. Retail trades on this integrated trading platform are more informed than another retail trading platform providing little information services while exhibiting no significant differences in informativeness compared with institutional trades using Bulge Bracket platforms. In particular, trade informativeness is more pronounced when there are accounting disclosures. The evidence suggests that self‐directed retail investors can benefit from a trading environment that provides rich and convenient access to a mosaic of information, particularly timely accounting disclosures.

ABSTRACT Stakeholders in the Chapter 11 reorganization process face significant information uncertainty about the post‐emergence prospects of the firm. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor to provide a disclosure statement containing “adequate information” about its financial status and a proposed reorganization plan but stops short of rigidly defining the adequacy standard. We document the heterogeneity in disclosure statement information across 16 distinct attributes and examine the variation in disclosures along several dimensions that reflect agency costs and coordination problems. We observe that Chapter 11 disclosure correlates more with claimant‐ and case‐specific characteristics than pre‐bankruptcy debtor characteristics. Our results illustrate the importance of institutional features in specific disclosure settings such as bankruptcy court filings. The research questions and methods of this study were registered via the Journal of Accounting Research ’s registration‐based editorial process.

ABSTRACT Upward influencers, employees who are more favorably perceived by their supervisors than their peers and subordinates, are predicted by economic and accounting theories and are found to be ubiquitous in many organizations. Despite their prevalence, the role of upward influencers in teams remains underexplored. This paper fills this void by using proprietary data from a service‐providing organization that allows for the identification of upward influencers based on its 360‐degree person evaluation. We find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the fraction of upward influencers in a team and team performance. In cross‐sectional analyses, we show that this relationship is driven by conditions when the need for collaboration and information sharing is high and when managers are less experienced. Additional tests exploring the mechanisms for the role of upward influencers in teams suggest that they impair team horizontal relationships through lowering the willingness to communicate, share knowledge, and offer mutual assistance among team members. Yet, teams with upward influencers build better vertical relationships with supervisors, which, in return, is associated with supervisors allocating more of their time to provide team members with feedback and guidance. Taken together, this study contributes to the understanding of upward influencers in teams.

ABSTRACT We provide prevalence estimates for five forms of earnings manipulation based on executives’ reports about their firms’ actual reporting practices. After preregistering our methods and analyses via the Journal of Accounting Research ’s registration‐based editorial process, we recruit nearly a thousand executives from firms listed in the Russell 3000 Index to participate in either a survey or a list experiment; the hallmark of the latter being additional privacy protections designed to promote honest disclosure about self‐incriminating information. In our survey, 26.8% of executives disclose at least one form of earnings manipulation at their firm in the 2018–2023 period: 18.0% report changing an operational activity to meet a near‐term earnings target at the expense of long‐term value (i.e., real earnings management), 8.8% report intentionally obfuscating unfavorable information, 6.6% report manipulating accruals, 3.9% report withholding material information, and 0.0% report accounting fraud. Our list experiment produces an economically higher result in two cases, estimating that 29.9% of firms engaged in real earnings management and 12.4% committed accounting fraud over the same time period. We conclude that while a traditional survey can provide credible lower‐bound estimates for the prevalence of many forms of earnings manipulation, list experiments encourage more honest disclosure in some cases.

ABSTRACT Examining test statistics from articles in six leading accounting journals, we detect discontinuities in their distributions around conventional significance thresholds ( p‐ values of 0.05 and 0.01) and find an unusual abundance of test statistics that are just significant. Further analysis reveals that these discontinuities are more prominent in studies with smaller samples and are more salient in experimental than in archival studies. The discontinuity discrepancy between experimental and archival studies relates to several proxies for researcher degrees of freedom. Nevertheless, this evidence does not imply that experimental research is more prone to questionable research practices than archival studies. Overall, our findings speak to the concern of whether accounting researchers could exercise undisclosed discretion to obtain and report statistically significant results. Based on our results, a healthy skepticism of some just‐significant test statistics is warranted.

ABSTRACT I study how the disclosure of the liquidity coverage ratio mandated for a group of systemically important U.S. banks affects peer banks' liquidity holdings. I predict that the disclosure mitigates uncertainty about aggregate liquidity risk by providing insight into the likelihood of market‐wide liquidity shocks and specific sources of liquidity stress. This uncertainty resolution, in turn, reduces nondisclosing banks' precautionary demand for liquidity. Using bank business interactions to measure the treatment intensity of the disclosure, I find that more treated nondisclosing banks cut their liquidity significantly more in response to the disclosure. In addition, the disclosure rule was followed by lower overall liquidity and a build‐up of systemic risk, indicating an economically considerable disclosure spillover effect in the aggregate. My paper reveals a new economic force, the spillover effect of mandated liquidity disclosure, that shapes banks' liquidity holdings.

ABSTRACT This paper examines how firms’ tax policy expectations (TPE) evolve around and relate to their investment responses to changes in tax policy. Using a text‐based approach to measuring TPE, we find that two recent tax policy–changing events—namely, the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)—spawned considerable between‐ and within‐firm variation in TPE, with aggregate time‐series patterns in TPE occasionally challenging prevailing assumptions in previous research. Further, we observe that event‐induced TPE relate to investment both before and in response to the TCJA's passage in 2017, with offsetting associations between its first and second moments, and that these TPE moderate the TCJA's intended investment‐stimulating effect. Furthermore, we document a difference between domestic and multinational firms in their TPE‐investment response, with the former (latter) more likely to adjust the level (shift the country location) of their investment. Overall, our findings support the idea that TPE can impact investment behavior in the face of a tax policy change and suggest that our methodology can be used by future research to incorporate TPE into analyses of tax policy effects.

ABSTRACT Research documents price co‐movements, or “spillovers,” between focal firms and their peers at focal firms’ earnings announcements. We find that both signed and absolute co‐movements between focal‐ and peer‐firm returns are significantly lower at earnings‐announcement dates compared to other dates. Analytically, we demonstrate that co‐movements do not necessarily indicate common information; instead, co‐movements measure the relative proportion of focal firm‐specific information to common information in focal‐firm earnings announcements. We study three settings where information transfers might be higher: when focal firms report significant earnings surprises, are industry leaders, or share correlated earnings patterns with peer firms. We continue to find lower return correlations during focal‐firm earnings announcements. We conduct two alternative tests but fail to find evidence that common information released during focal‐firm earnings announcements is significantly greater than on other days. These results raise doubt about the extent of the information externality attributable to financial‐report releases.

ABSTRACT We investigate the impact of observing peers’ information acquisition on financial analysts’ allocation of attention. Using the timely disclosure mandate by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a setting, we find that, shortly after analysts observe that a firm has been visited by peer analysts, they reduce short‐term attention to that firm, as indicated by a reduced tendency to conduct follow‐up visits. Nonvisiting analysts who do not conduct follow‐up visits are more likely to discontinue coverage of the visited firm. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the timely disclosure reveals the first‐mover advantage of visiting analysts, leading nonvisiting ones to reallocate their limited attention. We also find that, compared with the pre‐mandate period, the information environments of visited firms deteriorate immediately after an analyst's visit but not over the longer term. Further evidence suggests that the timely disclosure mandate has positive externalities in the form of increased immediate attention to and improved short‐term information environments of unvisited peer firms.

ABSTRACT We study whether federal judges’ personal exposure to financial fraud affects their professional behavior, in the form of sentencing outcomes in white‐collar cases. Following the methodology outlined in our registered report, we construct a novel measure of financial fraud exposure based on judges’ direct shareholdings in firms that commit financial fraud. Using this measure, we exploit the random assignment of cases to judges to examine whether judges exposed to fraud in one firm are (1) less likely to rule in favor of defendants in white‐collar cases involving other firms and (2) less likely to grant favorable pretrial motions to defendants. We find minimal evidence in support of either (1) or (2), concluding that for all but the most serious frauds, judges are unlikely to let their personal victimhood experience affect their professional sentencing behavior with respect to related cases. Our study broadens our understanding of the spillover effects of financial fraud enforcement and contributes to the literature on how judges’ personal experiences can shape judicial decision‐making.