Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT The test developed in Mishkin [1983] (hereafter, MT) is widely used to test the rational pricing of accounting numbers. However, contrary to the perception in the accounting literature, the exclusion of variables from the MT's forecasting and pricing equations leads to an omitted variables problem that affects inferences about the rational pricing of accounting variables. Only if the omitted variables are rationally priced is their exclusion irrelevant. Failure to recognize this issue leads accounting researchers to employ the MT without appreciating how omitted variables affect the inferences they draw. We demonstrate that when additional explanatory variables are included in the MT, the rational pricing of accruals is not rejected. That is, the accrual anomaly documented in Sloan [1996] vanishes when additional explanatory variables are incorporated into the MT. We also show that in accounting research settings, where samples are large, ordinary least squares (OLS) is equivalent to the MT. As a result, accounting researchers should consider using OLS or be more explicit about the exact advantages of the MT over OLS in their research setting.

ABSTRACT This paper examines interpretation of accounting standards that provide implementation guidance via affirmative or counter examples. Based on prior psychology research, we predict that practitioners engage in “example‐based reasoning” such that they are more likely to conclude that their case qualifies for the same treatment as the example. We test our predictions in two experiments in which participants judge the appropriateness of income‐statement recognition. Experiment 1 uses Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students and varies example type (affirmative, counter) and case (revenue recognition, expense recognition) in a 2 × 2 design. Experiment 1 supports our predictions. Experiment 2 uses more experienced practitioners, and varies example type (affirmative, counter, both) in a 1 × 3 design. Experiment 2 supports the use of example‐based reasoning, and indicates that practitioners in the “both” condition respond as if they had only received an affirmative example. These results have implications for understanding how guidance that accompanies accounting standards can result in aggressive or conservative application of standards.

We investigate a sample of 50 firm‐events, identified in the Global Research Analysts Settlement, in which analysts were discovered to have acted misleadingly ex post. In this setting, analysts' incentives caused them to issue public disclosures that differed from their private beliefs. We document that these firms' institutional holdings decline significantly during the period in which the analysts issued misleading disclosures. During this period daily small‐size trades (a proxy for individual investors) are dominated by buy orders while daily large‐size trades (a proxy for institutional investors) are dominated by sell orders. Short interest increases during the event period, consistent with the idea that sophisticated investors are selling. Our estimates of investors' trading losses show that individual investors lost about two and a half times the amount lost by institutions. Overall, the results suggest a wealth transfer from individuals to institutions that is likely attributable to analysts' misleading behavior.

ABSTRACT We examine whether accrual earnings quality is a priced information risk factor in a dividend change setting. We define information risk as the probability that firm‐specific financial statement information pertinent to investor pricing decisions is of low precision, and use the factor‐mimicking portfolio returns formed on the Dechow‐Dichev [2002] accrual quality (AQ) metric to proxy for the information risk (IR) factor returns. We augment the Fama‐French three‐factor model with this IR factor, and find that dividend initiation and increase firms exhibit a decrease in the factor loadings on the IR factor while dividend decrease firms exhibit an increase in the corresponding factor loadings, but such changes in the factor loadings occur months prior to the dividend change announcements. The results are robust to further controls for operating risk and using an alternative measure of information risk. Further analysis on changes in information characteristics such as AQ, the probability of informed trading score (PIN), forecast dispersion, and return volatility surrounding dividend change events are consistent with the asset pricing results. Overall, we interpret our results as being consistent with investors treating the information risk associated with the precision of financial statement information as a priced risk factor, with both the precision and pricing changing in predictable directions around dividend changes. However, while we attempt to control for operating risk changes in additional tests, we cannot completely rule out changes in operating risk as a competing alternative explanation for our observed results.