Historic cost, Market value, Replacement cost, Inventory

ABSTRACT I investigate how the use and voluntary disclosure of synthetic leases is affected by incentives to defer cash outflows and manage the financial statements by keeping debt off the balance sheet. I find that managers of cash‐constrained firms with incentives to defer cash payments are more likely to finance asset purchases with synthetic leases. The mandated reporting for synthetic leases allows managers to avoid disclosing the financial consequences of these transactions. Managers of firms with incentives to use off‐balance‐sheet financing do not provide transparent disclosure about their synthetic leases. However, managers of cash‐constrained firms, which are less likely to use synthetic leases for financial reporting reasons, do voluntarily disclose the existence and financial consequences of these contracts. Alternative tests around FIN 46 adoption corroborate these findings.

C. Edward Arrington, William Hillison, Robert E. Jensen, An Application of Analytical Hierarchy Process to Model Expert Judgments on Analytical Review Procedures, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring, 1984), pp. 298-312

Annual shareholder meetings provide an opportunity for shareholders to express their concerns with corporate performance, pressuring managers to demonstrate good performance. We show that managers respond to the shareholder pressure by reporting positive corporate news before the annual shareholder meetings. Specifically, we find significantly positive average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the 40 days before the annual meeting date. The premeeting returns are significantly higher when shareholder discontent with managerial performance is likely to be stronger. The decile of companies with the worst past stock price performance exhibits average CARs of 3.4% and buy-and-hold returns of 7.0% during the 40-day premeeting period. Companies with poor past performance exhibit even higher premeeting returns when shareholder pressure on management is greater, such as when institutional ownership is high, when CEO compensation is high, and when shareholders submit proxy proposals on corporate governance. We complement the evidence based on CARs by showing how managers of poorly performing firms manage the timing and content of earnings announcements and management forecast announcements before the annual shareholder meetings. Overall, the results suggest that managers attempt to influence shareholders before annual shareholder meetings through positive news.

Victor L. Bernard, Robert C. Merton, Krishna G. Palepu, Mark-to-Market Accounting for Banks and Thrifts: Lessons from the Danish Experience, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 1-32

Louis J. Billera, David C. Heath, Robert E. Verrecchia, A Unique Procedure for Allocating Common Costs from a Production Process, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring, 1981), pp. 185-196

Advertising Expenditures, Advertising expenses, Amortization, Almon polynomial model

Risk Taking, Probability distribution, Decision making

Several recent studies have been conducted to determine the level of job satisfaction, and the determinants thereof, among accountants.' All these studies utilized the Maslow theory, which is based on a hierarchy of needs.2 Maslow's theory has sometimes been criticized on philosophical, methodological and hierarchical grounds. The theory states that human needs are ordered; that is they range from lower-order to higher-order needs. As one need is adequately fulfilled, the individual moves to the next

ABSTRACT We show that the cost of trading on negative news, relative to positive news, increases before earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that this asymmetry is due to financial intermediaries reducing their exposure to announcement risks by providing liquidity asymmetrically. This asymmetry creates a predictable upward bias in prices that increases preannouncement, and subsequently reverses, confounding short‐window announcement returns as measures of earnings news and risk premia. These findings provide an alternative explanation for asymmetric return reactions to firms' earnings news, and help explain puzzling prior evidence that announcement risk premia precede the actual announcements. Our study informs methods for research centering on earnings announcements and offers a possible explanation for patterns in returns around anticipated periods of heightened inventory risks, including alternative firm‐level, industry‐level, and macroeconomic information events.