Robert E. Hamilton, William F. Wright, Internal Control Judgments and Effects of Experience: Replications and Extensions, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 20, No. 2, Part II (Autumn, 1982), pp. 756-765

In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We build a model that is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated. We demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect the firm's assessed covariances with other firms' cash flows, which is nondiversifiable. The indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm's real decisions, which likely changes the firm's ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. We show that this effect can go in either direction, but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost of capital.

We investigate factors associated with firms' decisions in 2002 and early 2003 to recognize stock‐based compensation expense under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 123. We find that the likelihood of SFAS 123 expense recognition is significantly related to the extent of the firm's participation in capital markets, the private incentives of top management and members of the board of directors, the level of information asymmetry, and political costs. Although recognizing firms have significantly smaller SFAS 123 expense, we find no significant incremental relation between recognition likelihood and SFAS 123 expense magnitude after controlling for other factors that we expect explain the recognition decision. We also find positive and significant announcement returns for earlier announcing firms, particularly those stating that increased earnings transparency motivates their decision.

To improve audit effectiveness, public accounting firms have organized their practices to include hierarchical review by teams organized along industry lines. We examine how industry specialized auditor teams detect errors, using a sophisticated experimental design. Our analysis of nominal teams created from seniors and managers working individually shows that seniors add value to the team by detecting more mechanical errors while managers detect more conceptual errors. Working within specialization, managers and seniors both contribute in a nonredundant way to the team’s overall effectiveness. We also find that the nominal teams outperform real teams in the detection of mechanical but not conceptual errors. These results only hold when the auditors work within in their industry specialization. Out of specialization the auditors are not effective at detecting errors, and real teams perform below the nominal team benchmark in the detection of both mechanical and conceptual errors.

Sourcing, Make-or-Buy decisions, Product quality, Unverifiable information

Responsibility accounting, Principal-agent model, Performance, Hierarchical relationship

Expertise, Communication, Planning, Implementation

Line-item reporting, Principal-agent model, Disaggregation, Factor acquisition models

We use changes in the value of a firm's real estate assets as an exogenous change in a firm's financing capacity to examine (1) the relation between reporting quality and financing and investment conditional on this change, and (2) firms’ reporting quality responses to the change in financing capacity. We find that financing and investment by firms with higher reporting quality is less affected by changes in real estate values than are financing and investment by firms with lower reporting quality. Further, firms increase reporting quality in response to decreases in financing capacity. Our findings contribute to the literature on reporting quality and investment, and on the determinants of reporting quality choices.