This paper investigates whether the market rewards firms meeting current period earnings expectations, and whether any such reward reflects the implications of meeting expectations in the current period for future earnings or reflects a distinct market premium. We document that abnormal annual returns are significantly greater for firms meeting expectations, controlling for the information in the current year’s earnings. We then test whether firms meeting expectations experience higher returns simply because their expected future earnings are also higher. We find firms meeting expectations have significantly higher earnings forecasts and realized earnings than firms that do not. We find that controlling for these higher future earnings, firms meeting expectations in one or two years do not receive a greater valuation than their fundamentals would suggest. We find, however, that the market assigns a higher value to firms that meet expectations consistently, controlling for an estimate of the firm’s fundamental value

We use Dealscan , a database of private corporate lending agreements, to provide large–sample tests of the debt covenant hypothesis. Dealscan offers several advantages over the data available in previous studies, principally larger and more representative samples and the availability of extensive actual covenant detail. These advantages allow us to construct powerful tests in which we find clear support for the debt covenant hypothesis. We also use these data to provide broad evidence on the economic role of debt covenants. We find that private lenders set debt covenants tightly and use them as “trip wires” for borrowers, that technical violations occur relatively often, and that violations are not necessarily associated with financial distress. Finally, since we measure covenant slack directly, we report evidence that the extensively–used leverage variable is a relatively noisy proxy for closeness to covenants.

This paper examines the association between the cost of equity capital and levels of annual report and timely disclosure, and investor relations activities. We estimate the cost of equity capital using the classic dividend discount model. We find that the cost of equity capital decreases in the annual report disclosure level but increases in the level of timely disclosures. The latter result is contrary to theory but is consistent with managers’ claims that greater timely disclosures may increase the cost of equity capital, possibly through increased stock price volatility. We find no association between the cost of equity capital and the level of investor relations activities. We conclude that aggregating across different disclosure types results in a loss of information. Failing to include all disclosure types in regression analyses may lead to a correlated omitted variable bias and erroneous conclusions

Recent studies suggest the apparent delay in the stock‐price response to earnings announcements (i.e., post‐earnings announcement drift) is caused by investors who underestimate the autocorrelation of seasonally‐differenced earnings (persistence). I present results that suggest: (1) a firm’s future persistence is predictable on the basis of its past persistence; (2) the immediate stock‐price response to earnings is positively related to historical persistence; (3) post‐earnings‐announcement drift is independent of historical persistence; and (4) consistent with (2) and (3), the difference between a firm’s current observed persistence and that implied in stock prices is independent of its historical persistence. These results extend prior research by demonstrating that investors are aware not only that seasonally‐differenced earnings are autocorrelated, but that investors recognize firm‐specific differences in the magnitude of the autocorrelation.

We use a simulation model for a pharmaceutical R&D program to examine the tradeoff between objectivity and relevance of accounting information under various methods of R&D reporting. A simple capitalization rule, similar to the successful‐efforts method of capitalizing oil and gas exploration costs, provides a stronger relation between accounting information and economic values than immediate expensing of R&D outlays or capitalizing the full cost of outlays. The superior relevance of this “successful‐efforts” method persists even when earnings management is widespread.

Since 1995, managers of thousands of firms have voluntarily disclosed the expected date of their firm’s next quarterly earnings announcement to Thomson Financial Services Inc. These disclosures are approximately 500% more accurate than the simple time–series expected report dates used in prior accounting research. These disclosures are also informative. On average, managers who miss their own expected date eventually report earnings that fall about one penny per share below consensus forecasts for each day of delay. Investors respond by sending the price of late–announcing stocks down at the missed expected report date and continue to send them down as the reporting delay lengthens, consistent with our “day late, penny short” result. Despite this, we find that the market response at the time earnings are announced still depends on whether the announcement is early, on time, or late relative to the firm’s own expected report date.

We empirically investigate valuations of Internet firms at various stages of the initial public offering (IPO) from two perspectives. First, we examine the association between the valuation of Internet IPOs and a set of financial and nonfinancial variables, which prior anecdotal or empirical evidence suggests may serve as value drivers. Second, we document differences in IPO valuations between Internet and non‐Internet firms as well as across different stages in the IPO process—i.e., initial prospectus price, final offer price, and first trading day price—within each set of firms. Our primary two conclusions are as follows. First, there are noticeable differences between valuations of Internet and non‐Internet firms, especially at the prospectus and final IPO stage. Specifically, the valuation of non‐Internet firms generally follows the conventional wisdom regarding valuation: positive earnings and cash flows are priced, while negative earnings and negative cash flows are not. The valuation of Internet firms, however, departs from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced, and negative cash flows being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments. This difference between the two classes of firms may be expected, given the age and unique nature of the Internet industry. Second, there are significant differences between the initial valuation of firms at the prospectus and IPO stage and their valuation by the stock market at the end of the first trading day. For non‐Internet firms, the difference is largely ascribed to the relative offering size. For Internet firms, however, the differences are with respect to positive cash flows, sales growth, R&D, and high‐risk warnings, in addition to the relative offering size.

We examine the valuation performance of a comprehensive list of value drivers and find that multiples derived from forward earnings explain stock prices remarkably well: pricing errors are within 15 percent of stock prices for about half our sample. In terms of relative performance, the following general rankings are observed consistently each year: forward earnings measures are followed by historical earnings measures, cash flow measures and book value of equity are tied for third, and sales performs the worst. Curiously, performance declines when we consider more complex measures of intrinsic value based on short‐cut residual income models. Contrary to the popular view that different industries have different “best” multiples, these overall rankings are observed consistently for almost all industries examined. Since we require analysts’ earnings and growth forecasts and positive values for all measures, our results may not be representative of the many firm‐years excluded from our sample.

In this study we investigate the valuation implications of managerial actions undertaken by 57 Internet firms engaged in Business‐to‐Business (B2B) e‐commerce. We classify 3,007 managerial actions undertaken by our sample firms between the firm’s IPO date and September 30, 2000 into nine action categories: (1) acquisition of major customers, (2) introduction of new products and services, (3) promotional and marketing actions, (4) actions taken to address the concerns of stakeholders such as employees and the community at large, (5) announcements of technology, marketing, and distribution alliances, (6) completion of acquisitions, (7) expansion into international markets, (8) management team building actions, and (9) organizational changes. In the short window tests, we find a significant increase in stock price volatility over a three‐day event window surrounding the announcement of almost all actions suggesting that announcement of managerial actions provides value‐relevant information to the stock market. In the long window tests, we use factor analysis to group the counts of managerial actions taken by each firm over its post‐IPO life into two broad managerial initiatives—market penetration and organization building. These two initiatives explain a substantial portion of the cross‐sectional variation in the firms’ post‐IPO life stock market returns beyond that explained by both reported earnings and analysts’ forecasts of future earnings and revenues. Thus, investors appear to supplement relatively meager accounting information with data about the cross‐sectional intensity of managerial actions in setting stock prices of B2B Internet firms.

This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings‐per‐share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities