This paper examines the information voluntarily disclosed about corporate restructurings. In 1995 the FASB’s Emerging Issues Task Force reached a consensus opinion about mandatory restructuring disclosures. I use these requirements to construct a statistic that measures the amount of information voluntarily disclosed for a sample of firms from 1990–1993. Disclosure levels increased dramatically when the SEC targeted restructurings as an area for increased oversight in late 1993. Controlling for this SEC action, I document a positive association between the amount of information disclosed and increased monitoring by shareholders, suggesting that monitoring complements disclosure rather than substitutes for it. The amount disclosed is negatively related to the appointment of a new CEO prior to the restructuring, perhaps reflecting the use of the restructuring charge to manage earnings for these firms.

This study presents empirical evidence on the ex post costs of employee stock option (ESO) grants to issuing firms and examines whether the Black–Scholes [1973] model provides reasonable estimates of these values. Because there are no market prices for ESOs, the traditional avenues for testing option–pricing models are unavailable. This research relies instead on techniques from the economic forecasting literature, viewing model values as forecasts of the options’ payoff. The theoretically appropriate rate at which to discount ESO payoffs is derived under the maintained hypothesis that the Black–Scholes model is valid. This rate is used in estimating ex post ESO costs at the time of grant, which are then compared with Black–Scholes estimates using Theil’s [1966] tests of forecast rationality. Based on a sample of 966 ESO grants over 1963–1984, the results suggest that the Black–Scholes model, adjusted for concavity in the time to exercise using the Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin [1994] procedure, appears to provide reasonable estimates of ex post ESO costs for the average ESO grant. However, there is significant variability in the amount of model error on an individual grant basis.

This paper examines the association between the cost of equity capital and levels of annual report and timely disclosure, and investor relations activities. We estimate the cost of equity capital using the classic dividend discount model. We find that the cost of equity capital decreases in the annual report disclosure level but increases in the level of timely disclosures. The latter result is contrary to theory but is consistent with managers’ claims that greater timely disclosures may increase the cost of equity capital, possibly through increased stock price volatility. We find no association between the cost of equity capital and the level of investor relations activities. We conclude that aggregating across different disclosure types results in a loss of information. Failing to include all disclosure types in regression analyses may lead to a correlated omitted variable bias and erroneous conclusions.

This paper studies a model of “classifications manipulation” in which accounting reports consist of one of two binary classifications, preparers of accounting reports prefer one classification over the other, an accounting standard designates the official requirements that have to be met to receive the preferred classification, and preparers may engage in “classifications manipulation” in order to receive their preferred accounting classification. The possibility of classifications manipulation creates a distinction between the official classification described in the statement of the accounting standard and the de facto classification, determined by the “shadow standard” actually adopted by preparers. The paper studies the selection and evolution of accounting standards in this context. Among other things, the paper evaluates “efficient” accounting standards, it determines when there will be “standards creep,” it introduces and analyzes the notion of a Nash accounting standard, and it compares the standards set by sophisticated standard–setters to those set with less knowledge of firms’ financial reporting environments.

We define an intertemporal tax discontinuity (ITD) as a circumstance in which different tax rates are applied to gains realized at one point in time versus some other point in time. We study the effects of ITDs on market behaviors at the time of disclosures of firm performance, assuming that all investors who trade firm equities are subject to tax. The results of our paper suggest that relative to an economy in which ITDs are absent, ITDs may dampen trading volume and amplify price changes at the time of disclosure.

Finance theory proposes that firms’ cost of capital increases when market makers set wider spreads due to perceived higher information asymmetry across traders. Using a sample of UK investment property firms and controlling for firms’ non‐random selection of external monitors, we find evidence that market makers perceive information asymmetry across traders to be lower for firms employing external appraisers versus those employing internal appraisers. This evidence is consistent with liquidity‐motivated traders being unable to overcome such reliability differences using asset value information from sources other than accounting. We fail to find a similar difference for firms employing Big 6 versus non‐Big 6 auditors. Our findings contribute to the debate over the recognition of fair value estimates for long‐lived tangible assets by documenting that reliability differences attributable to differential monitoring by appraisers can affect information asymmetry, and therefore firms’ cost of capital.

This paper studies how firm disclosure activity affects the relation between current annual stock returns, contemporaneous annual earnings and future earnings. Our results show that firms with relatively more informative disclosures “bring the future forward” so that current returns reflect more future earnings news. We also find that changes in disclosure activity are positively related to changes in the importance of future earnings news for current returns. These results suggest that a firm’s disclosure activity reveals credible, relevant information not in current earnings, and that this information is incorporated into the current stock price.

This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings‐per‐share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities.

This paper analyzes annual corporate governance decisions at firms making initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock between 1996 and 1999. Our objective is to examine relations between firms’ corporate governance decisions and the informativeness of available measures of managerial performance. We consider financial measures such as earnings and stock return, as well as direct monitoring. We collect a sample of IPO firms from the manufacturing, Internet, and technology (non‐Internet) industries, and examine how the use of various performance measures in annual compensation grants and turnover decisions varies with the information environment of the firm and with the extent of venture capital influence. Consistent with prior research that finds earnings are of limited usefulness in firm valuation for Internet firms, we find Internet firms place less importance on earnings and greater importance on stock returns in determining compensation grants than do non‐Internet firms. We also find that compensation grants of firms with little or no venture capital influence display significantly stronger association with accounting and stock performance measures than those of firms with more intense monitoring by venture capitalists. This result is consistent with direct monitoring and the use of explicit performance measures acting as substitute governance mechanisms.