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What's My Line? A Comparison of Industry Classification Schemes for Capital Market Research

Journal of Accounting Research 2003 41(5), 745-774
ABSTRACT This study compares four broadly available industry classification schemes in a variety of applications common to capital market research. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes have been available since 1939 but are being replaced by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. The Global Industry Classifications Standard (GICS) SM system, jointly developed by Standard & Poor's and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), is popular among financial practitioners, whereas the Fama and French [1997] algorithm is used primarily by academics. Our results show that GICS classifications are significantly better at explaining stock return comovements, as well as cross‐sectional variations in valuation multiples, forecasted and realized growth rates, research and development expenditures, and various key financial ratios. The GICS advantage is consistent from year to year and is most pronounced among large firms. The other three methods differ little from each other in most applications.

Are Selling, General, and Administrative Costs “Sticky”?

Journal of Accounting Research 2003 41(1), 47-63
A fundamental assumption in cost accounting is that the relation between costs and volume is symmetric for volume increases and decreases. In this study, we investigate whether costs are “sticky”—that is, whether costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. We find, for 7,629 firms over 20 years, that selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs increase on average 0.55% per 1% increase in sales but decrease only 0.35% per 1% decrease in sales. Our analysis compares the traditional model of cost behavior in which costs move proportionately with changes in activity with an alternative model in which sticky costs occur because managers deliberately adjust the resources committed to activities. We test hypotheses about the properties of sticky costs and how the degree of stickiness of SG&A costs varies with firm circumstances.