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Analyst Coverage Overlaps and Interfirm Information Spillovers

Journal of Accounting Research 2021 59(4), 1425-1480 open access
We offer a novel perspective on the role of sell‐side analysts as information intermediaries in capital markets by documenting a flow of information in a new direction, namely, from analysts to the firms they cover. We use analyst coverage overlaps and patent citations to examine analyst‐induced information spillovers about technology and industry trends. Consistent with analyst coverage–related information flows, firms are more likely to cite another firm's patent if that firm is covered by the same analyst. The effect varies with analysts' specialization, experience, and level of activity. Firms with more analyst‐based connections to peers also show greater corporate innovation. Collectively, our evidence indicates that financial analysts not only reduce information asymmetries between firms and capital market participants but also facilitate the production of business intelligence through feedback and interfirm information spillovers.

Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Journal of Accounting Research 2020 58(3), 589-642 open access
Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.