Most firms covary more positively with downmarkets than upmarkets—a phenomenon I refer to as “risk asymmetry.” I predict and find that risk asymmetry is caused, at least in part, by a firm's ability to selectively obfuscate poor performance. Risk asymmetry decreases significantly when firms are required to adhere to the more stringent auditing standards mandated under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, however this decrease is more muted for firms with weak internal controls. Consistent with my predictions, these patterns are stronger for more market‐sensitive firms and weaker for firms that include relative performance evaluation in their CEOs' pay packages. Taken together with prior literature (which documents that risk asymmetry is priced), my results suggest that a firm can lower its cost of capital by credibly reducing its ability to obfuscate value‐relevant information.

We use a field experiment in professional sports to compare effects of providing absolute, relative, or both absolute and relative measures in performance reports for employees. Although studies have documented that the provision of these types of measures can benefit performance, theory from economic and accounting literature suggests that it may be optimal for firms to direct employees’ attention to some types of measures by omitting others. In line with this theory, we find that relative performance information alone yields the best performance effects in our setting—that is, that a subset of information (relative performance information) dominates the full information set (absolute and relative performance information together) in boosting performance. In cross‐sectional and survey‐data analyses, we do not find that restricting the number of measures shown per se benefits performance. Rather, we find that restricting the type of measures shown to convey only relative information increases involvement in peer‐performance comparison, benefitting performance. Our findings extend research on weighting of and responses to measures in performance reports.

We offer a novel perspective on the role of sell‐side analysts as information intermediaries in capital markets by documenting a flow of information in a new direction, namely, from analysts to the firms they cover. We use analyst coverage overlaps and patent citations to examine analyst‐induced information spillovers about technology and industry trends. Consistent with analyst coverage–related information flows, firms are more likely to cite another firm's patent if that firm is covered by the same analyst. The effect varies with analysts' specialization, experience, and level of activity. Firms with more analyst‐based connections to peers also show greater corporate innovation. Collectively, our evidence indicates that financial analysts not only reduce information asymmetries between firms and capital market participants but also facilitate the production of business intelligence through feedback and interfirm information spillovers.

In early 2017, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) mandated the disclosure of audit participants, including the lead audit partner and other audit firms participating in the audit (“component auditors”). In this study, we examine whether investors use these disclosures in a way that influences their investment decisions, a primary goal of the PCAOB. Using trading volume, absolute abnormal returns, and bid–ask spreads, we find little evidence of a significant investor response following the disclosure of partner identity or component auditor participation in the first three years of the requirement. We also examine instances where these disclosures are most likely to be informative (e.g., partners associated with restatements or component auditors with PCAOB deficiencies) and find no significant investor response. Taken together, we find little evidence that capital markets respond to partner and component auditor identity in the United States.

The SEC prohibits the presentation of non‐GAAP measures before corresponding GAAP measures; however, a large proportion of non‐GAAP reporters present non‐GAAP EPS before GAAP EPS in their earnings announcements. This noncompliance raises questions about whether firms use prominence to highlight higher or lower quality non‐GAAP information. For firms reporting non‐GAAP EPS between 2003 and 2016, prominent non‐GAAP EPS is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting. Further tests reveal that nonregulatory incentives, rather than regulatory costs, explain this relation. Specifically, prominence is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting in settings where prominence is not regulated, investors ignore prominence when non‐GAAP reporting quality is lower, and the minority of firms using prominence to mislead exhibit characteristics associated with weaker investor monitoring. Overall, we provide evidence that regulatory noncompliance can reflect an intent to inform, and that most firms use prominence to highlight higher quality non‐GAAP information despite prohibitive regulation.