This paper extends the variance decomposition framework of Campbell [1991], Campbell and Ammer [1993], and Vuolteenaho [2002] to address the relative value relevance of accrual news, cash flow news, and expected‐return news in driving firm‐level equity returns. The extension is based on the Feltham‐Ohlson [1995, 1996] clean surplus relations. Using three models, this study shows that all three factors, accruals, cash flows, and expected future discount rates are value relevant. Moreover, accrual news is found to significantly dominate expected‐return news in driving firm‐level stock returns. Operating income news is also found to significantly dominate both expected‐return news and free cash flow news in driving firm‐level stock returns. Furthermore, after splitting net income into cash flow and accrual earnings components in the Vuolteenaho model, accrual earnings news and cash flow earnings news are found to equally drive firm‐level stock returns and to dominate expected‐return news. Further disaggregation of the data yields some evidence that accrual earnings news is a more important factor than cash flow earnings news in driving current stock returns. Overall, the three models indicate that changes in expected future accruals are a primary driver, if not the primary driver, of current stock returns.

Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong investor protection, where investor protection is defined as the extent of the laws that protect investors' rights and the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement . The purpose of this study is to test this assertion by investigating whether these measures of investor protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests indicate that strong law enforcement institutions significantly improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas extensive investor protection laws do not. In addition, we find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is more likely to be associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative. Finding that strong law enforcement institutions are associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is consistent with good corporate governance requiring law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e., protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders). Finding that investor protection laws are not associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is open to several explanations. For example, investor protection laws may not be as important as strong law enforcement in fostering good governance, the set of laws we examine may not be the set that are most important in promoting good governance, or measurement error in our surrogate for extensive investor protection laws may reduce the power of our test of this variable.