This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden information and hidden actions. It finds that SOX: (1) reduced the conflict of interest between shareholders and their CEOs, mainly by reducing shareholder loss from CEOs deviating from their goal of expected value maximization; (2) increased the cost of agency, or the risk premium CEOs are paid to align their interests with those of shareholders; (3) increased administrative costs in the primary sector (which includes utilities and energy) but the effect in the other two broadly defined sectors, services and consumer goods, was more nuanced; and (4) had no effect on the attitude of CEOs toward risk.

Could real‐time big data help unravel material firm events? How would it compare with firm disclosure and traditional media in terms of timeliness and completeness? Could big data provide incremental value‐relevant information for investors? With these questions in mind, we use a novel data set of cell phone “pings” (i.e., geolocation signals from mobile devices) to track production disruptions (outages)––material events for U.S. oil refineries. We first validate the construct by examining the effects of outages on local gas prices and firms’ accounting performance. Our main analyses show that (1) refining firms do not voluntarily disclose refinery outages identified by cell phone pings; (2) traditional media cover only a small portion of ping‐based outages; (3) the stock market finds ping‐based outages to be value relevant but incorporates the information with delay. Further analysis suggests that given the incomplete media coverage and lack of firm disclosure, investors appear to learn the financial impact of such outages through subsequent earnings announcements. Our evidence has implications for regulators such as the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission as they continue to evaluate both the compliance and usefulness of disclosures for material firm events such as production disruptions.

We find that mutual funds whose managers are socially connected with firm auditors hold more shares of these firms and generate superior portfolio returns. Cross‐sectional results reveal that the relation between social connections and mutual fund stockholdings is more pronounced: when the social connections are stronger, when the auditor is in a better position or has stronger incentives to acquire private information, when the fund manager exercises more power, for small audit firms, for auditors in areas with poor investor protection, and for public firms with greater business opacity or private information. Other results are consistent with fund managers electing to schedule their corporate site visits to coincide with the fieldwork of their connected auditors, as would be expected if fund managers time their visits to meet with these auditors to facilitate information transfer. Additionally, we observe associations between fund trading prior to earnings surprises and audit opinions, and the presence of social connections between fund managers and firm auditors. Finally, we show that mutual funds and firms in which they invest tend to appoint connected auditors and pay them higher fees. Collectively, we document empirical patterns that would arise if socially connected auditors and mutual fund managers share information.