GAAP provisions in loan contracts specify how to address the effect of accounting changes on financial covenants. I document a pronounced upward trend in and the dominance of frozen‐on‐request (FOR) GAAP provisions, which incorporate accounting changes unless either the borrower or the lender requests a freeze. FOR GAAP streamlines the process of incorporating accounting changes into covenant calculations by obviating the need for renegotiations and prevents opportunistic GAAP freezes by requiring good faith renegotiations. Therefore, FOR GAAP is more likely to incorporate accounting changes beneficial to covenant informativeness, leading to lower false positives (i.e., Type I errors of financial covenant violations) and false negatives (i.e., Type II errors of financial covenant violations). Based on a large sample of loan contracts, I find that FOR GAAP decreases false positives and false negatives after controlling for self‐selection bias and that the decrease is more pronounced when accounting changes relevant to financial covenants are more significant. My study provides new evidence of the role accounting standards and GAAP provisions play in debt contracting efficiency.

We examine the economic consequences of a rule designed to improve consumers' understanding of mortgage information. The 2015 TILA‐RESPA Integrated Disclosures rule (TRID) simplifies the mortgage disclosures provided to consumers. As a consequence, TRID‐affected mortgages become a less attractive investment opportunity to banks. Our main results document that mortgage applications affected by TRID are less likely to be approved following the rule's effective date. We find evidence consistent with both a decrease in consumers' information processing costs and an increase in banks' secondary market frictions, providing insight into the potential channels through which this reduction in mortgage credit operates. We also find that banks partially compensate for reduced mortgage lending by increasing small business lending, and that fintechs absorb mortgage demand in areas with reduced mortgage lending by banks. Our study documents real actions that firms take in response to disclosure transparency regulation and contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of such regulation.

We examine how firms respond to the increased workplace transparency due to the coverage on Glassdoor.com, which collects and disseminates reviews on employee satisfaction. Leveraging the staggered timing of first‐time reviews on Glassdoor, we use a difference‐in‐differences design and find that after being reviewed on Glassdoor, firms improve their workplace practices, measured by corporate social responsibility scores on employee relations and diversity. Consistent with firms improving their workplace practices to remain competitive in the labor market, we find that such improvement concentrates in firms with negative initial reviews and with high labor intensity. We also find firms increase disclosures about workplace practices after being reviewed and the increase concentrates in firms with high institutional ownership, consistent with firms providing more disclosures to appease investors. Overall, our findings suggest that the increased workplace transparency through social media has a disciplinary effect on corporate policies.

Between 2000 and 2003 a series of disclosure and analyst regulations curbing abusive financial reporting and analyst behavior were enacted to strengthen the information environment of U.S. capital markets. We investigate whether these regulations reduced security mispricing and increased stock market efficiency. After the regulations, we find a significant reduction in short‐term stock price continuation following analyst forecast revisions and earnings announcements. The effect was more pronounced among higher information uncertainty firms, where we expect security valuation to be most sensitive to regulation. Analyst forecast accuracy also improved in these firms, consistent with reduced mispricing being due to an improved corporate information environment following the regulations. Our findings are robust to controls for time trends, trading activity, the financial crisis, analyst coverage, delistings, and changes in information uncertainty proxies. We find no concurrent effect among European firms and a regression discontinuity design supports our identification of a regulatory effect.

We investigate the frictions that impede individual investors’ use of accounting information and, in particular, their costs of monitoring and acquiring accounting disclosures. We do so using an archival setting in which individuals are presented with automated media articles that report both current earnings news and past stock returns. Although these investors have earnings information readily available, we find no evidence that their trades incorporate it. Instead we find that their trading responds to the trailing stock returns presented in the articles. Our study raises questions about the efficacy of regulations that aim to aid less sophisticated investors by increasing their awareness of and access to accounting information.

We exploit the staggered state‐level adoption of the Riegle‐Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) to examine how banking deregulation and the resulting increase in bank competition affect firms’ auditor choices. We find that an exogenous increase in the degree of interstate branch banking deregulation leads to a reduction in firms’ propensity to engage a Big N or industry expert auditor. This main result, when combined with our cross‐sectional analyses, offers evidence suggesting that deregulation leads to less demand for higher quality auditors because (1) firms have increased access to credit, which reduces the benefits of higher audit quality; (2) entering banks’ lending expertise substitutes for higher quality financial statements; (3) incumbent banks with less lending expertise seek to protect their rents by preferring that borrowers provide lower quality financial statement information; and (4) external stakeholders delegate their monitoring to banks to a greater degree, resulting in less demand for higher quality financial statements. As such, our study sheds light on how the U.S. credit market's infrastructure shapes firms’ auditor choice decisions.

Leveraging micro‐level data on individual employees’ bank and credit card transactions, we examine the impact of earnings announcement (EA) news on employee spending. Utilizing an event study methodology, we find strong evidence that EA news elicits significant reactions in employee spending. These reactions are stronger for employees located in the firm's headquarters state, with longer tenure, possessing investment experience, or earning higher wages, consistent with these employees being more likely to attend to their firm's EAs. The reactions are also stronger for the fourth fiscal quarter than interim quarters, suggesting that year‐end results garner greater employee attention. Furthermore, consistent with media facilitating employee processing of EA news, the reactions are stronger for EAs covered by a larger number of news articles. Finally, in line with the notion that EAs contain information about employees’ future cash flows, we find that EA news predicts changes in employee wages and that employees with higher past wage‐to‐EA news sensitivity exhibit stronger spending reactions. Overall, our findings provide evidence of the role of financial reporting in employees’ spending decisions.