We adopt a financial‐materiality approach in studying the costs and benefits of measuring greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on social welfare. Production by firms internally generates direct GHG emissions (Scope 1 emissions) whereas outsourcing to suppliers generates indirect emissions (Scope 3 emissions). Our analysis incorporates two frictions: (1) long‐term negative environmental externalities caused by emissions and (2) fragmentation in regulating emissions disclosures across jurisdictions. We show firms' failure to internalize the environmental externalities provides a rationale for mandating Scopes 1 and 3 emissions disclosures. However, such disclosures induce emissions leakage. Disciplining emissions leakage calls for setting complementary—rather than independent—disclosure requirements for Scopes 1 and 3 emissions. Our analysis underscores the importance of improving the reliability of Scope 3 emissions measurements given that measurements of Scope 1 emissions are highly reliable for public firms in Europe and the United States. Regulators can further enhance the disciplinary effects of Scope 3 emission measurements by requiring the allocations of Scope 3 emissions in supply chains to individual firms, especially when allocating Scope 3 emissions is more reliable, and for firms/industries that are more prone to transition climate risk relative to physical climate risk

Audit theory and regulation assumes that auditors’ commercial motivation threatens audit quality. In this registered report, we use data from two Big Four firms in the Netherlands and provide empirical evidence on the relation between auditors’ commercial motivation and (1) compensation, (2) total audit effort, and (3) audit quality. We proxy commercial motivation as the time that individual auditors report allocating to commercial activities. We hypothesize that auditors’ commercial effort is positively related to compensation and we find mixed support. Next, we hypothesize that auditors’ commercial effort is negatively related to the audit effort but we find no support. Turning to audit quality, we hypothesize a negative direct relation between auditors’ commercial effort and audit quality but we find no support. We also predict a positive indirect relation in which auditors’ commercial effort increases quality control reliance leading to higher audit quality. We find some support for this hypothesis but only when we use technical consultations to proxy for quality control. Auditors with greater commercial effort maintain quality because they rely more on technical consultations. In sum, our study challenges the assumption that auditors’ commercial effort threatens audit quality and questions the need for additional regulation to constrain commercial motivation

Substantial evidence suggests that regulatory agencies in the United States can be captured by the politicians who oversee them. We provide novel evidence of a federal agency in which capture is limited: the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Although patent applications from politically connected applicants are slightly more likely to be approved despite being of lower ex post quality, additional analyses suggest these outcomes are not indicative of capture. In particular, the disclosure quality of connected patents' legal claims increases more than unconnected patents during the review process, narrowing the scope of the patents and constraining the intellectual property rights. Furthermore, connected patents are no more likely than others to be litigated ex post, suggesting these patent grants are not spurious. Our findings provide insights into how the design of a regulator can limit the benefits that accrue to politically connected firms

Capital flows increase in response to new public information. Conventional explanations typically conclude that this reflects a rational response to reduced risk. However, investors may also be overconfident in their ability to benefit from new information, even when it is publicly available and does not provide a relative advantage. We exploit two complementary settings to examine how this “better‐than‐average” mechanism affects capital flows. Archival evidence from horse race betting markets shows capital flows increase following the public provision of a summary measure of horse performance, even though more total parimutuel wagering necessarily implies a greater wealth transfer from bettors to tracks. A controlled lab experiment provides direct causal evidence of our proposed mechanism. Combined, our results suggest that new public information can increase capital flows due to investors’ overconfidence in their ability to benefit from information relative to others. Our findings inform regulators seeking to understand the consequences of expanding the public information available to individual investors

We introduce the idea of cross‐regulatory disclosure avoidance, whereby firms attempt to counteract expansions of disclosure under one regulation through actions that reduce disclosure under a different one. We study whether firms redact information from material contracts when they face new rules to disclose segment information. Using SFAS No. 131 as a plausibly exogenous shock to segment disclosure, we find that firms increasing the number of reported segments after the rule change exhibit a greater increase in redaction than firms maintaining the same number of segments. Consistent with proprietary cost motives, the increases are concentrated among firms with greater divergence in profitability across segments, higher abnormal segment profitability, and more negative abnormal stock returns in response to the finalization of the rule. Also, treated firms that redact after the rule change have abnormally profitable segments that they previously did not disclose. Firms that observables predict would increase redaction but did not experience declines in sales growth and profit margin. We find no evidence that agency cost motives drive the increases in redaction or, more generally, nondisclosure of segment performance before SFAS No. 131

We examine the effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) regulatory oversight on private debt contracting outcomes, using the signing of the multilateral memorandum of understanding (MMoU) as a natural experiment. The MMoU enables the SEC to take stricter punitive actions against wealth expropriation by cross‐listed firms’ insiders and enforce better compliance with applicable rules and regulations. We find that enhanced SEC oversight in the post‐MMoU regime lowers loan spreads by 36 basis points, thus saving an average cross‐listed firm approximately $9 million in direct loan costs over the life of a bank loan. Cross‐sectional analyses show that the effect is more pronounced for borrowers from countries with weaker institutions, borrowers with greater accounting discretion, and for loans arranged by top lenders or loans not secured by collateral. Conversely, the effect is less pronounced for borrowers who use IFRS or when the SEC faces greater budgetary constraints. Enhanced SEC oversight also leads to an increase in loan maturity and a decrease in financial covenants. Our evidence suggests that while the SEC's primary mandate is to protect public equity and bond investors, its supervision yields substantial borrowing cost savings and more lenient nonprice loan terms in the private debt markets as well