Watts (2003) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that accounting conservatism decreases managerial incentives to make negative net present value investments. I develop and test a new hypothesis that accounting conservatism is associated with managers making less risky investments. I find that under more conservative accounting managers make less risky acquisitions and that firms with accounting-based debt covenants drive this association. This result is consistent with conservative firms avoiding risky investments because of the potential for large losses to trigger debt covenants. Conservatism reducing risk-shifting can in part explain debt holders׳ demand for conservative accounting.

I study how private communication among competitors affects their public disclosures. Theory suggests that competing firms can use public disclosure to coordinate, and predicts less public disclosure when there is more private communication. Using data on strategic alliances, I predict and find that firms that enter strategic alliances with competitors reduce their public disclosure, and that the reduction is more pronounced for alliances that allow for more private communication.

The conference paper by Gerakos, Lang and Maffett (2013) provides reliable, descriptive evidence on the post-IPO performance of firms listing on the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Their findings are consistent with both a failure of private sector regulation and incorrect market expectations about AIM's investor protections. In this discussion of Gerakos et al. (2013), I highlight the strengths and limitations of their conference paper, summarize how various regulatory and market factors could produce the observed systematic under-performance of AIM offerings, and outline paths for future research on the topic.

Firms that alter their divisional configurations on average increase shareholder wealth. Gains appear to come from information about investment opportunities and increases in efficiency. Performance before the restructurings suggests poorly organized firms are motivated by market pressures to change their organizations. Change also occurs in healthy firms as part of the growth process. Restructuring often occurs where there is no evidence of takeover threats. While stock prices increase around the restructurings, there is a contemporaneous decline in earnings due to increased expenses. These findings appear inconsistent with the contention that the market pressures managers into focusing on short-run earnings.

We review research from the 1990s that examines the determinants and consequences of accounting choice, structuring our analysis around the three types of market imperfections that influence managers’ choices: agency costs, information asymmetries, and externalities affecting non-contracting parties. We conclude that research in the 1990s made limited progress in expanding our understanding of accounting choice because of limitations in research design and a focus on replication rather than extension of current knowledge. We discuss opportunities for future research, recommending the exploration of the economic implications of accounting choice by addressing the three different reasons why accounting matters.

This paper provides evidence that uncontested director elections provide informative polls of investor perceptions regarding board performance. We find that higher (lower) vote approval is associated with lower (higher) stock price reactions to subsequent announcements of management turnovers. In addition, firms with low vote approval are more likely to experience CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO compensation, fewer and better-received acquisitions, and more and better-received divestitures in the future. These findings hold after controlling for other variables reflecting or determining investor perceptions, suggesting that elections not only inform as a summary statistic, but incrementally inform as well.

This study explores whether NielsenIQ scanner data from U.S. retailers contain incremental information about the GAAP revenue of corresponding manufacturers. Using retail product/store/week data from 2006 to 2018, we construct a measure of aggregated consumer purchases at the manufacturer/quarter level, and find that it strongly predicts GAAP revenues. In addition, analyst forecasts of revenues have predictable errors, which implies that analysts do not fully incorporate the information in consumer purchases. Exploring investment implications, we find that hedge portfolios that buy (sell) stocks of firms with high (low) abnormal consumer purchases generate annualized returns on the magnitude of 14%–19%, depending on specification. Overall, these findings suggest that scanner data on consumer purchases provide an information edge over GAAP revenue, shedding light on the benefits of using transactional data.

This paper demonstrates that the market reaction to announcements of seasoned stock offerings varies with the presence of outside agents - accounting firms, commercial banks, and underwriters - who monitor the firm. The stock price reaction is a positive function of the quantity of bank debt in a firm's financial structure, the quality of the firm's investment banker, and the quality of the public accounting firm that serves as its external auditor. The evidence supports theoretical models that imply external agents audit, monitor, and certify decisions to issue seasoned common stock.

We examine the economic determinants of short-sale supply, and its consequences for future stock returns. Lendable supply increases with expected borrowing costs and decreases with financial statement constructs that indicate overvaluation. Although rising loan fees help ease supply constraints, we find shares are still least available when they are most attractive to short sellers. Using a number of firm characteristics, we derive useful instruments for real-time loan supply and demand conditions in the lending market. Further, we show that (1) when lendable supply is binding (non-binding), short-sale supply (demand) is the main predictor of future stock returns, (2) abnormal returns to the short-side of nine well-known market anomalies are attributable solely to “special” stocks, and (3) loan fees significantly reduce the profitability of the short side and several of these anomalies cease to be profitable. Overall our evidence highlights the central role played by the supply of lendable shares in equity price formation and returns prediction.

Studies of the information content of accounting earnings typically assume earnings response coefficients do not vary across firms. Valuation models relating earnings to security prices, however, predict that earnings response coefficients are positively associated with revision coefficients (coefficients relating current earnings to future earnings) and negatively associated with expected rates of return. A random coefficient regression model provides evidence consistent with these predictions. This evidence has implications for interpreting multiple regression models that relate abnormal returns to unexpected earnings and other information variables.