This paper describes the background and objectives of a series of papers written fifty years ago at the London School of Economics (LSE). One objective was to encourage the use of accounting numbers in economic research. A second objective was to improve the theory and practice of accounting. Understanding cost accounting and opportunity costs within a firm was tied to understanding the organization of firms. The theory of the accounting system is part of the theory of the firm. Like a similar request made fifty years ago, the paper concludes with a call for interdisciplinary studies between economics and accounting.

This paper examines the effect of managerial legal liability coverage on earnings conservatism. Using directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance coverage and cash for indemnification as a proxy for managerial legal liability coverage, we find that the higher the managerial liability coverage, which reduces the expected legal liability of managers, the less conservative the firm's earnings. We also find that managerial legal liability coverage has a stronger influence on earnings conservatism in a legal regime with higher litigation risk. Our results are consistent with the threat of litigation conditioning managers to practice conservative accounting.

We examine the effect of option listing on the immediate stock-price response to earnings announcements. Contrary to prior studies using earlier data, we find firms initiating option trading after 1986 fail to exhibit a significant decline in earnings response. We then examine 420 firms initiating option trading during 1973–1993. In a series of tests controlling for market-wide effects and changing firm size we find some evidence that option listing may actually increase the stock-price response to earnings, but no evidence listing reduces the response. Both longitudinal and cross-sectional tests produce similar results.

There are frequent expressions of concern in the accounting, economics, and legal literature about managers' conflicting duties and incentives in management buyouts. This study is motivated by a concern about the managerial incentive to reduce reported earnings prior to the announcement of the buyout proposal. Our analysis of a sample of 175 management buyouts during 1981-88 provides evidence of manipulation of discretionary accruals in the predicted direction in the year preceding the public announcement of management's intention to bid for control of the company.

In within-firm analysis of 1,805 executives, executives implicated in financial reporting fraud cases have significantly stronger equity incentives than their within-firm peers who are not implicated in the fraud. Executives implicated in fraud cases also have significantly stronger equity incentives than executives at non-fraud firms in similar roles. However, the equity incentives of non-implicated executives at fraud firms are no different than those for executives at non-fraud firms. The results are significant across executive roles and for equity incentives measured as wealth sensitivity to changes in stock price or stock price volatility. Executive-level analysis that considers which executives are implicated in the fraud may provide more precise measurement of the association and statistical significance of the relationship between equity incentives and fraud. Finally, firm-level measures that consider the equity incentives of all members of the top management team may better identify fraud firms than do measures focusing on one executive.

The comment reviews major features of the research design of the DMS study. Several opportunities for future research are discussed, including the exploration of the underlying information variables that influence analyst's forecasts.

This study shows real estate investment trusts' (REITs) characteristics and compensation incentives vary with compensation method. Formula-based compensation encourages advisors to generate cash from their assets, whereas discretion-based compensation encourages cash conservation. Consequently, dividend yields are 82 percent of formula REITs' total returns, but only 33 percent of discretion REITs'. Partly due to REITs switching from formula-based to discretion-based compensation, the number of discretion REITs has grown while the number of formula REITs has declined. Average formula REIT return performance is inferior and switches tend to follow a period of poor financial performance; performance improves after such changeovers.

This study empirically examines possible motivational factors leading to reductions in pension plan overfunding. The results indicate that firms with severe financial weakening terminate pension plans. Firms with less severe financial weakening change actuarial assumptions to reduce required cash contributions to pension plans. Although decline in marginal tax rates and increased susceptibility to takeover are positively associated with overfunding reductions, increased financial weakening appears to be the most plausible explanation. The results are consistent with termination of pension plans being a costly source of financing.