Knowledge that Transforms

Prior studies attribute the turn-of-the-year effect whereby small capitalization stocks earn unusually high returns in early January to tax-loss-selling by individual investors and window-dressing by institutional investors. My results suggest that a significant portion of the effect on turn-of-the-year returns that prior studies attribute to window-dressing is actually attributable to tax-loss-selling by institutional investors. Among small capitalization stocks, I find that institutional investors with strong tax incentives and weak window-dressing incentives realize significantly more losses in the fourth quarter than in the first three quarters of the calendar year, and that their fourth quarter realized losses have a significant impact on turn-of-the-year returns. A one percentage point change in these institutional investors' fourth quarter realized losses scaled by a firm's market capitalization results in an increase of 47 basis points in the firm's average daily return over the first three trading days of January, which represents a 46 percent change for the mean firm.

I examine the short- and long-term impact of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) on cross-listed foreign private issuers. Both short- and long-term test results suggest that the costs of SOX compliance significantly exceed its benefits and reduce the net benefits of cross-listings.

We outline a systematic approach to incorporate macroeconomic information into firm level forecasting from the perspective of an equity investor. Using a global sample of 198,315 firm-years over the 1998–2010 time period, we find that combining firm level exposures to countries (via geographic segment data) with forecasts of country level performance, is able to generate superior forecasts for firm fundamentals. This result is particularly evident for purely domestic firms. We further find that this forecasting benefit is associated with future excess stock returns. These relations are stronger after periods of higher dispersion in expected country level performance.

This study investigates whether an auditor's experience of litigation in the recent past affects subsequent financial reporting quality. At the audit firm level, we find accounting misstatements occur significantly less (more) often after audit firms are sued (not sued). At the audit office level, the negative association between past litigation and future misstatements is stronger for offices who were directly implicated in the litigation than for the non-accused offices of sued audit firms. Therefore, the litigation experiences of both audit firms and audit offices are incrementally significant predictors of future financial reporting quality.

A firm׳s investment in corporate social responsibility (CSR) builds a positive image of caring for social good and imposes additional costs on executives׳ informed trading, which is widely perceived self-serving. We thus expect executives of CSR-conscious firms to be more likely to refrain from informed trading. We find that executives of CSR-conscious firms profit significantly less from insider trades and are less likely to trade prior to future news than executives of non-CSR-conscious firms. The negative association between CSR and insider trading profits is more pronounced when executives׳ personal interests are more aligned with the interests of the firm.

In this study, I examine whether firms and executives with long-term political connections through contributions and lobbying incur lower costs from the enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I find that politically connected firms on average are less likely to be involved in SEC enforcement actions and face lower penalties if they are prosecuted by the SEC. Contributions to politicians in a strong position to put pressure on the SEC are more effective than others at reducing the probability of enforcement and penalties imposed by an enforcement action. Moreover, the amounts paid to lobbyists with prior employment links to the SEC, and the amounts spent on lobbying the SEC directly, are more effective than other lobbying expenditures at reducing enforcement costs faced by firms.

We examine whether the recent regime of increased liquidity and trading activity is associated with attenuation of prominent equity return anomalies due to increased arbitrage. We find that the majority of the anomalies have attenuated and the average returns from a portfolio strategy based on prominent anomalies have approximately halved after decimalization. We provide evidence that hedge fund assets under management, short interest and aggregate share turnover have led to the decline in anomaly-based trading strategy profits in recent years. Overall, our work indicates that policies to stimulate liquidity and ameliorate trading costs improve capital market efficiency.

The recent economic downturn resulted in firms generating significant tax losses, which they risked losing if they experienced an ownership change. In response, a number of loss firms adopted poison pill plans. We document a significant negative market reaction to the announcement of 62 poison pill adoptions related to net operating losses (NOLs), suggesting that in general investors do not consider management׳s claim that the pills are adopted to preserve a valuable tax asset to be credible. However, we find cross-sectional variation consistent with investors considering whether a pill is legitimately adopted to preserve the NOL or to entrench management.

We examine the effect of large shareholders׳ ex ante selling incentives on firms׳ voluntary disclosure choices in the setting of IPO lockup expirations. We find evidence that managers delay disclosures of bad news, not for their own benefit, but to enable influential pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares at more favorable prices. Delays are more pronounced when aggregate selling incentives are greater, when uncertainty is high, and when venture capitalists, influential investors with strong selling incentives, own more shares. Simultaneously, managers׳ disclosure decisions reflect litigation concerns; no significant delays occur when litigation risk is high or when managers trade themselves.