Knowledge that Transforms

This study separates trading volume into buyer- and seller-initiated activities and examines the directional volume reaction in small and large trades to different types of earnings news. ‘Good’ (‘bad’) news triggers brief, but intense, buying (selling) in the large trades. However, a persistent period of unusually high buying activity is observed in the small trades irrespective of the news. This anomalous proclivity of small traders to buy is robust across firm size, trading volume, and different earnings expectation models. Several explanations are discussed, although the behavior does not seem fully explained by existing theories.

Announcements of stock repurchase tender offers are examined as a source of information about firms' future earnings prospects and market risk levels. We document positive earnings surprises and equity systematic risk reduction following tender offers. Announcement stock price reactions are positively correlated with earnings surprises over the concurrent and subsequent two years, and negatively correlated with changes in equity market risk. Finally, stock price reactions to quarterly earnings announcements are more strongly correlated with time-series based earnings surprises in the year prior to the tender offer than during the subsequent year, consistent with tender offer announcements conveying earnings information.

This paper investigates the hypothesis that CEOs in their final years of office manage discretionary investment expenditures to improve short-term earnings performance. We examine the behavior of R & D expenditures for a sample of firms in industries that have significant ongoing R & D activities. The results suggest that CEOs spend less on R & D during their final years in office. However, we find the reductions in R & D expenditures are mitigated through CEO stock ownership. There is no evidence that the reduced R & D expenditures are associated with either poor firm performance or reductions in investment expenditures that are capitalized for accounting purposes.

This paper's results are consistent with the choice of accounting method in the oil and gas industry being dominated by measurable characteristics of firms and guided by the principles of efficient contracting. The results are inconsistent with an alternative hypothesis, opportunistic behavior by managers. The efficient contracting explanation is also consistent with the empirical findings from earlier studies; [e.g., Lilien and Pastena (1982) and Deakin 1979)].

Accounting-based dividend constraints in lending contracts are imperfect means of mitigating conflicts of interests between stockholders and bondholders since managers have flexibility to make accounting decisions to circumvent the covenants. This paper documents firms' accounting and dividend responses to an increase in the tightness of dividend constraints. Firms cut dividends and do not appear to make accounting changes to circumvent the dividend restriction. The magnitude of the dividend cut is proportional to the tightness of the dividend constraint. This suggests that accounting-based covenants are effective means for bondholders to restrict firmsś dividend policies.

I examine three composite analyst forecast of earnings per share as proxies for expected earnings. The most current forecast weakly dominates the mean and median forecasts in accuracy. This is evidence that forecast dates are more relevant for determining accuracy than individual error. Consistent with previous research, I find analysts more accurate than time-series models. However prior knowledge of forecast errors from a quarterly autoregressive model predicts excess stock returns better than prior knowledge of analysts' errors. This is inconsistent with previous research, and is anomalous given analysts' greater accuracy.

During the latter half of the 1930s Australian taxation law changes induced companies to adopt a holding company legal structure which increased agency costs associated with external financing. This paper argues that contracting practices designed to minimize these costs played an important part in the evolution of consolidated financial reporting. Consistent with this view the likelihood of consolidation is found to be a function of the presence of cross-guarantees, management's share of a firm's equity, and the number and type of subsidiaries.

Certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive's continued employment. These wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives. Abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty-three events. These abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive's status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive's ‘talents’ and decision-making responsibility, and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement.