We characterize the properties of optimal accounting rules in a signaling game. An impatient firm sells shares to competitive investors. The firm can signal its private information about the fundamental by retaining a fraction of the shares. In addition, the firm can commit to disclosing information according to a set of accounting rules chosen ex ante. Information disclosure reduces signaling cost so that perfect disclosure is optimal. When perfect disclosure is impossible, the optimal accounting rule features a lower bound and a summary statistic of the fundamental. The interpretation of the lower bound is consistent with accounting conservatism, and the statistic summarizes the information most relevant to the firm׳s valuation. The justification for accounting conservatism relies on the existence of information asymmetry and the infeasibility of perfect accounting disclosure. This is consistent with the conjecture of LaFond and Watts (2008) that information asymmetry calls for accounting conservatism.

We analytically study the economic consequences of the disclosure of managerial compensation contracts in a setting where two firms, by designing compensation contracts for their respective managers, compete for a new investment opportunity. Each manager is privately informed about her firm's profitability from this investment. We find that the disclosure leads to firms' emphasizing short-term stock performance in their managers' contracts. This, in turn, induces managers to signal favorable private information via myopic overinvestment, which deters rival firms' investments and gains their own firms a competitive edge. Nonetheless, such strategic use of compensation contracts is absent when the contracts are not disclosed; under this regime, equilibrium contracts only focus on long-term outcomes. Moreover, while disclosure-mandate-induced managerial myopia erodes firm profits, it may benefit consumer and social welfare. Our theory illuminates the economic consequences of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosure implemented in 2006.