Knowledge that Transforms

This paper's results are consistent with the choice of accounting method in the oil and gas industry being dominated by measurable characteristics of firms and guided by the principles of efficient contracting. The results are inconsistent with an alternative hypothesis, opportunistic behavior by managers. The efficient contracting explanation is also consistent with the empirical findings from earlier studies; [e.g., Lilien and Pastena (1982) and Deakin 1979)].

Accounting-based dividend constraints in lending contracts are imperfect means of mitigating conflicts of interests between stockholders and bondholders since managers have flexibility to make accounting decisions to circumvent the covenants. This paper documents firms' accounting and dividend responses to an increase in the tightness of dividend constraints. Firms cut dividends and do not appear to make accounting changes to circumvent the dividend restriction. The magnitude of the dividend cut is proportional to the tightness of the dividend constraint. This suggests that accounting-based covenants are effective means for bondholders to restrict firmsś dividend policies.