Knowledge that Transforms

This paper is an empirical examination of the nature of information conveyed by open-market stock repurchase announcements. The findings weakly indicate that: (1) there are positive unexpected annual earnings in the repurchase announcement year and positive revisions of earnings forecasts by analysts around announcement dates, and that (2) repurchase announcements are followed by declines in the repurchasing firms' common-stock risk. In addition, a regression analysis shows that repurchase announcement returns are positively (negatively) correlated with the earnings (risk) changes conveyed by repurchase announcements.

This paper investigates the hypothesis that CEOs in their final years of office manage discretionary investment expenditures to improve short-term earnings performance. We examine the behavior of R & D expenditures for a sample of firms in industries that have significant ongoing R & D activities. The results suggest that CEOs spend less on R & D during their final years in office. However, we find the reductions in R & D expenditures are mitigated through CEO stock ownership. There is no evidence that the reduced R & D expenditures are associated with either poor firm performance or reductions in investment expenditures that are capitalized for accounting purposes.

This paper addresses whether events leading to three regulatory accounting principles issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board affected the market value of Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls). The market reaction to these regulations is predicted to be positive since they effectively eased minimum regulatory net worth requirements. A significant market reaction is observed for the regulation that allowed S&Ls to increase regulatory net worth by permitting appraised equity capital. However, results are inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis associated with the regulations permitting deferral of loan losses and net worth certificates.