Do industries use advertising strategically when subject to the threat of political costs? Communication via advertising can assuage public concerns, which, in turn, reduces the incentives for elected officials to impose regulations on the industry. We identify expected political costs using cases of repeated industry testimony at congressional hearings. To disentangle strategic advertising in response to the threat of political costs from advertising for other reasons (e.g., reputation building or to generate sales), we exploit the fact that only politicians overseeing industry-relevant hearings can impose costs on a given industry. We find that subsequent to these hearings, affected industries increase their advertising by 132% more in the electorates of the politicians overseeing the hearings, relative to the increase in the electorates of other politicians. The strategic increase in advertising is magnified in the electorates served by the most senior politicians on the committees and those with the most politically engaged citizens. The increase is also pronounced in election years, when the hearings are longer, contain more negative language, or include a higher proportion of legislation-related words. Moreover, our results are not driven by politicians’ decisions to serve on committees relevant to their local-area firms. In sum, our findings provide novel evidence about corporate communication with non-investor stakeholders

We investigate the consequences of the “revolving door” for trial lawyers at the SEC’s enforcement division. If future job opportunities motivate SEC lawyers to develop and/or showcase their enforcement expertise, then the revolving door phenomenon will promote more aggressive regulatory activity (the “human capital” hypothesis). In contrast, SEC lawyers can relax enforcement efforts in order to develop networking skills and/or curry favor with prospective employers at private law firms (the “rent seeking” hypothesis”). We collect data on the career paths of 336 SEC lawyers that span 284 SEC civil cases against accounting misrepresentation over the period 1990–2007. Our overall evidence is consistent with the “human capital” hypothesis. However, we find some evidence of “rent seeking” when SEC lawyers are based in Washington DC and when defense firms employ more former SEC lawyers. The revolving door likely impacts numerous aspects of SEC regulation setting and enforcement. This study examines accounting-related civil cases and is not able to study administrative or non-accounting enforcement cases. Further, the study does not address the choice of which cases to pursue, the incentives of employees other than trial lawyers, or how the revolving door affects rule making. Subject to these caveats, our study provides an important first look into the effects of revolving door incentives on the SEC’s enforcement process and lays the groundwork for future research