Knowledge that Transforms

More powerful tests of a theory of choice of accounting methods and the effect of changes in these choices on equity values are provided. The power increase comes from efficiently aggregating results across studies. One conclusion is that at least six variables common to more than one study have explanatory power. These variables are managerial compensation, leverage, size, risk, and constraints on interest coverage and dividends. Another conclusion is that the posterior probability that the theory taken as a whole has explanatory power is close to one. This conclusion includes the effect of variables that only appear in one study.

This study presents evidence on whether analysts' earnings forecasts anticipate management's discretionary accruals choices. If analysts anticipate discretionary accruals, earnings forecast errors are composed of at least two parts: cash-flow and discretionary-accruals forecast errors. Management's bonus-maximizing incentives allow for identification of circumstances in which discretionary-accruals forecast errors are expected to offset cash-flow forecast errors and circumstances in which they are expected to exacerbate cash-flow errors. Controlling for the unexpected cash-flow variability, the empirical results are consistent with these predictions.

Prior studies of discretionary accounting choices have generally relied on one or more proxy variables to measure closeness to debt covenant restrictions without actually examining the existence or extent of restrictive covenants. This study tests the validity of the most commonly used proxy, the debt–equity ratio, by examining its relation to actual debt covenant restrictions for a random sample of U.S. firms. The results indicate that several versions of the debt–equity ratio capture the existence and tightness of retained earnings restrictionsand the existence of net tangible asset and working capital restrictions, but are unrelated to four other covenant restrictions.

This study examines whether components of operating, financing, and investing cash flows are differentially associated with annual security returns, as predicted by theoretical models in finance and economics. The results of the study indicate that disaggregation of net income into cash from operations and accruals does not contribute significantly to the security returns beyond the contribution of net income alone. However, further disaggregation of financing and operating cash flows into their components significantly improves the degree of association as predicted by theory. In contrast, we find no evidence of differential associations across components of investing cash flows.

This paper analyzes incentives for voluntary disclosure of proprietory information. Proprietory information, if disclosed, provides strategic information to potential competitors, but can be helpful to the financial market in valuing the firm more accurately. Focusing on a stylized model of a static entry game, we show that a fully revealing disclosure equilibrium exists when the prior of the market is optimistic or the entry cost is relatively low. When the prior is pessimistic or the entry cost is high, however, both non- and partial-disclosure equilibria obtain. Our analysis predicts that competition in the product market encourages voluntary disclosure.

This paper examines the bond and stock price reactions to the announcement of insubstance defeasances, and the motivations for the transaction. We find a reliably positive bond price reaction and a reliably negative stock price reaction. However, the bond price reaction is much less than would be predicted had the defeased bonds been made riskless. We find evidence suggesting that some firms defease to window-dress their earnings, some defease to avoid restrictions in bond covenants, and some defease as a use for excess cash on hand.

This paper analyzes voluntary disclosure strategies of a privately informed firm when the information is relevant for the market price of the firm and also for an opponent. Favorable information increases the market price but might induce the opponent to take a discrete action that imposes proprietary costs on the firm. It is shown that there is always a full-disclosure equilibrium. There can exist partial-disclosure equilibria with two nondisclosure intervals. Comparative statics show some counter-intuitive results, e.g., higher proprietary costs or higher risk of an adverse action can make disclosure of favorable information more or less likely.