Knowledge that Transforms

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders and managers is addressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

This paper investigates the extent of intra-industry information transfers associated with the half-yearly earnings announcements of a sample of Australian firms. The ‘omitted factor’ interpretation of Foster's (1981) results is examined using a recursive systems specification of the return generating process to model extra-market return covariation in cross-section. Although some aspects of the results do appear sensitive to the alternative methodologies, the overall conclusion is consistent with Foster (1981) and supports the existence of intra-industry information transfers associated with firms' earnings releases.

Several hypotheses concerning pension funding strategy are tested in a cross-sectional regression model on a sample of 255 firms. Results are consistent with the following explanations: (1) finance incentives (tax benefits and financial slack) for high-level funding, (2) labor incentives for low-level funding, and (3) financial statement incentives relating to political costs for high-level funding and debt contracting costs for low-level funding. Pension funding strategy appears to be complex, involving tradeoffs between funding incentives. The nature of these interactions and tradeoffs remains to be clarified through future research.

The differential information hypothesis advanced by Atiase (1980) states that information production and dissemination by private parties for the purpose of identifying mispriced securities is an increasing function of firm size. This study examines two corollaries of that hypothesis. First, security prices of large firms anticipate accounting earnings earlier than security prices of small firms. Second, for a given level of ‘unexpected’ earnings, the cumulative abnormal returns of small firms exceed those of large firms. The results are generally consistent with Atiase's hypothesis.

Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980) employ a regression of percentage change in prices on percentage change in earnings in which data are grouped by the dependent variable. Reverse regression offers a more intuitive and direct way to assess the information content of security prices, the objective of Beaver et al. While grouping is asymptotically equivalent, reverse regression is a more efficient way of examining the incremental explanatory power of lagged values of percentage change in price with respect to accounting earnings.

Several published studies claim that acquisition targets can be accurately predicted by models using public data. This paper points out a number of methodological flaws which bias the results of these studies. A fresh empirical study is carried out after correcting these methodological flaws. The results show that it is difficult to predict targets, indicating that the prediction accuracies reported by the earlier studies are overstated. The methodological issues addressed in this paper are also relevant to other research settings that involve binary state prediction models with skewed distribution of the two states of interest.

Daily returns are used to investigate the effect of preferred stock rating change announcements on preferred and common stock prices. Announcements that are free of confounding events, ‘clean’ announcements, significantly affect preferred stock prices. However, the effect occurs after the day of announcement, mostly on event day +1. Conversely, there is no evidence ‘clean’ announcements affect common stock prices. Larger preferred stock abnormal returns are associated with announcements that are contaminated by confounding events, but the abnormal returns appear to be the result of the confounding events more than the rating change.

This paper investigates factors associated with audit firm positions on Auditing Standards Board issues during the three-year period ending during 1984. The major finding is that firms with relatively structured audit technologies tend to favor proposed statements while firms with relatively unstructured technologies do not. Audit firm size is not associated with firm position. Also, Big 8 firms favoring proposed statements have lower staff-to-partner ratios and concentrate less in auditing. The staff-to-partner ratio is negatively associated with technology. The results' implications for auditing profession organization studies and auditing and financial reporting research are investigated.

This paper investigates accounting for interest by Australian real estate developers. It argues that management's choice of accounting technique is the result of ex ante contracting to prevent management opportunistic behavior, rather than a manifestation of opportunistic behavior per se. The argument provides a richer description of accounting choice and explains why, in Australia, leverage and the accounting method choice are correlated in the absence of bond covenants. The argument also explains why, inconsistent with political cost arguments, larger firms are more likely to capitalize than expense interest.

Managers often release earnings forecasts in advance of actual earnings announcements. It would appear that managers should at best be indifferent to such release given that the actual earnings will be disclosed at a future date. However, if the manager's objective is to maximize his firm's market value and he has control of production decisions, he may be motivated to release an earnings forecast. The reason is that the forecast release gives investors a more favorable assessment of the manager's ability to anticipate economic environment changes and to adjust production plans accordingly. Forecast release can thereby translate into a higher firm market value.