Knowledge that Transforms

In 1981 the FASB issued a new standard for accounting for foreign currency translation, SFAS 52. The standard provided a gradual transition period, allowing firms to select from several possible adoption dates. This study extends the research on the positive theory of accounting choice to examine the factors associated with a management's choice of adoption date. The comparison reveals that early adopters were smaller, typically decreased in pre-charge earnings the year before adoption, had less stock owned by directors and officers, and were more constrained on dividend payouts and interest coverage ratios than later adopters.

In this paper, an informational asymmetry exists between investors and the issuer of an initial public offering about the value of the security. To avoid market failure, a solution is proposed in which the issuer makes a disclosure about firm value that is verified by an investment banker. The investment banker enters into a contingent contract with investors which imposes a penalty if the ex post observable cash flow indicates fraudulent disclosure. A bivariate signalling model is formulated and solved, and testable implications are derived from comparative statics analysis.

Managers of conglomerates are hypothesized to effect firm-enlarging actions that yield greater remuneration for them but losses for shareholders. This hypothesis is tested by examining the gains and losses to senior managers and shareholders of twenty-nine large conglomerates from 1970 through 1975. The data reveal that the average manager's annual gains and losses from changes in stock returns far exceeded his remuneration. Furthermore, top managers of conglomerates where stock returns decreased left their positions more frequently than did the officers of the other conglomerates. These findings are inconsistent with the self-serving managerial hypothesis as it usually is stated.