Knowledge that Transforms

Economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance, and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful. In this paper, we argue that previous cross-sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results. Using data that focus on individual executives over time, we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales. The results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized.

This study examines the stock price reaction around the announcement of proposed changes in long-term managerial compensation packages. The evidence indicates that on average these plans are met with positive market reactions, i.e., shareholder wealth increases. Further, we are unable to differentiate the market reaction to various types of long-range compensation schemes. This result is consistent with the notion that firms with different characteristics will resolve their managerial compensation requirements differently. Thus no particular compensation package necessarily dominates all others.

Studies examining managerial accounting decisions postulate that executives rewarded by earnings-based bonuses select accounting procedures that increase their compensation. The empirical results of these studies are conflicting. This paper analyzes the format of typical bonus contracts, providing a more complete characterization of their accounting incentive effects than earlier studies. The test results suggest that (1) accrual policies of managers are related to income-reporting incentives of their bonus contracts, and (2) changes in accounting procedures by managers are associated with adoption or modification of their bonus plan.

The papers in this volume and briefly summarized in this introduction document that: (1) executive compensation is positively related to share price performance: (2) poor firm performance is associated with increased executive turnover; (3) managers choose accounting accruals in ways that increase the value of their bonus awards; (4) the adoption of new short- and long-term executive compensation plans and golden parachutes are associated with positive share price reactions; (5) the death of a firm's founder is associated with positive share price reactions; and (6) managers are less likely to make merger bids that lower their stock prices when they hold more stock in their firm. These findings are interpreted as generally supporting the view that executive compensation packages help align managers' and shareholders' interests.

The effect of audit firm size on prizes is a complex function of competition in the market for audit services, product differentiation, and scale economics to large firms. In this study, a competitive market is supported in Australia with product differentiation to Bif Eight accounting firms. Specially, Big Eight accounting firms have significantly higher audit prices than non-Big Eight firms. This results holds for ‘large’ and ‘small’ auditees. A test is also made of price cutting in the Australian market. Price cutting is defined as lower initial audit fees than continuing engagement fees for a comparable audit. Test results do not evidence price-cutting behavior by accounting firms. There is in fact weak evidence that initial audit fees are higher than continuing engagement fee levels. Higher initial fees suggest that accounting firms may recover at least some of the audit start-up costs immediately.

Provisions in the securities acts provide incentives to purchasers of common stocks to initiate class action lawsuits when stock prices decline at and preceding announcements that directly reduce, or imply a reduction in, previously reported accounting book values. Reported common stock returns associated with alleged misrepresentations in financial statements are consistent with incentives provided by the law. Classification of misrepresentations based on hypothesized relations between announcements and security returns results in observed differences in the association between litigated accounting announcements and common stock returns.

The relationships among mandated accounting changes, bond covenants and security prices has been the focus of several studies. These studies have provided mixed evidence on the existence of a bond covenant effect on security prices. This paper suggests that inconclusive prior results are a consequence of inappropriately measuring the default risk of debt. Using an option pricing framework, it is shown that the debt to equity alone is not an adequate measure of default risk. In particular, both the debt to equity ratio and the total risk of the firm are necessary to adequately model the bond covenant effects of an accounting change. These theoretical propositions are supported by the empirical analysis of the security market reaction to changes in oil and gas accounting.