Knowledge that Transforms

The effect of audit firm size on prizes is a complex function of competition in the market for audit services, product differentiation, and scale economics to large firms. In this study, a competitive market is supported in Australia with product differentiation to Bif Eight accounting firms. Specially, Big Eight accounting firms have significantly higher audit prices than non-Big Eight firms. This results holds for ‘large’ and ‘small’ auditees. A test is also made of price cutting in the Australian market. Price cutting is defined as lower initial audit fees than continuing engagement fees for a comparable audit. Test results do not evidence price-cutting behavior by accounting firms. There is in fact weak evidence that initial audit fees are higher than continuing engagement fee levels. Higher initial fees suggest that accounting firms may recover at least some of the audit start-up costs immediately.

Provisions in the securities acts provide incentives to purchasers of common stocks to initiate class action lawsuits when stock prices decline at and preceding announcements that directly reduce, or imply a reduction in, previously reported accounting book values. Reported common stock returns associated with alleged misrepresentations in financial statements are consistent with incentives provided by the law. Classification of misrepresentations based on hypothesized relations between announcements and security returns results in observed differences in the association between litigated accounting announcements and common stock returns.

The relationships among mandated accounting changes, bond covenants and security prices has been the focus of several studies. These studies have provided mixed evidence on the existence of a bond covenant effect on security prices. This paper suggests that inconclusive prior results are a consequence of inappropriately measuring the default risk of debt. Using an option pricing framework, it is shown that the debt to equity alone is not an adequate measure of default risk. In particular, both the debt to equity ratio and the total risk of the firm are necessary to adequately model the bond covenant effects of an accounting change. These theoretical propositions are supported by the empirical analysis of the security market reaction to changes in oil and gas accounting.

This study assesses the stock market's reaction to a series of events leading up to a mandated change in accounting for retail land sales. Evidence is found to support the conclusion that the market reacted to some of these events in a manner consistent with the effects of the accounting change on debt annagement contracts. A distinctive aspect of the analysis is the efficient use of security returns data to detect market reactions and to derive empirical distributions of test statistics employed. The analysis is extended by a model for grouping regression equations known as seemingly unrelated regressions. However, the gains from this extension are modest.

A number of recent research papers use two-stage procedures in lieu of a single multiple regression, in some cases purportedly as a solution to colinearity among independent variables. We demonstrate that, since collinearity is inherently a data problem rather than a statistical problem, no partitions of dependent or independent variables, orthogonal or otherwise, can provide insights into the relative influence of collinear variables. For the class of linear unbiased estimators this follows directly from the Gauss-Markov Theorem, but we demonstrate some of the results in detail as an aid to interpreting particular papers.

We investigate whether announcements of ‘subject to’ audit opinions and disclaimers of opinions affect stock prices. The results indicate that many firms experience negative abnormal performance prior to the release of qualified opinions, and that the magnitude of prior abnormal performance differs across types of qualifications. However, there is little evidence of a stock price effect when qualifications are disclosed publicly. It is difficult to construct powerful tests of the announcement effect of a qualified opinion for three reasons. First, the announcement date of the qualification is not easily identified. Second, measuring the unanticipated component of the announcement requires a model of market expectations. Third, controls must be employed for concurrent disclosures. The problems concerning event date identification have ramifications for other accounting event studies, particularly studies of disclosures typically contained in the annual report or 10-K.

This paper examines bond-for-bond refundings and their effects on stock returns. Refundings can affect the reported income, cash flows (including taxes), dividend constraints and financial ratios of firms. For a sample of 36 NYSE and ASE firms that performed refundings between 1971 and 1980, stock returns were significantly higher than predicted (only) around the release of the quarterly earnings announcement that included the refunding's effects. While the refundings were found to have many characteristics that were hypothesized to benefit shareholders, only the change in earnings per share was found to be associated with the prediction errors. Further, there appears to be no refunding-related information released in the quarterly earnings announcement, except for the refunding gain. These results imply that a portfolio of refunding firms can be created in advance of the quarterly earnings announcement that will generate abnormal returns around the earnings announcement. Because trading rules are inconsistent with the concept of an efficient capital market, these results constitute an anomaly.

The study investigates the information content of the foreign sensitive payment disclosures made during the Securities and Exchange Commission's ‘voluntary’ disclosure program. The results of the information content tests and the tests of the relationship between payment size and abnormal security returns imply that investors may have been reacting to the expectation of the loss of future business or to the possibility of future government sanctions.