Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate whether announcements of ‘subject to’ audit opinions and disclaimers of opinions affect stock prices. The results indicate that many firms experience negative abnormal performance prior to the release of qualified opinions, and that the magnitude of prior abnormal performance differs across types of qualifications. However, there is little evidence of a stock price effect when qualifications are disclosed publicly. It is difficult to construct powerful tests of the announcement effect of a qualified opinion for three reasons. First, the announcement date of the qualification is not easily identified. Second, measuring the unanticipated component of the announcement requires a model of market expectations. Third, controls must be employed for concurrent disclosures. The problems concerning event date identification have ramifications for other accounting event studies, particularly studies of disclosures typically contained in the annual report or 10-K.

This paper examines bond-for-bond refundings and their effects on stock returns. Refundings can affect the reported income, cash flows (including taxes), dividend constraints and financial ratios of firms. For a sample of 36 NYSE and ASE firms that performed refundings between 1971 and 1980, stock returns were significantly higher than predicted (only) around the release of the quarterly earnings announcement that included the refunding's effects. While the refundings were found to have many characteristics that were hypothesized to benefit shareholders, only the change in earnings per share was found to be associated with the prediction errors. Further, there appears to be no refunding-related information released in the quarterly earnings announcement, except for the refunding gain. These results imply that a portfolio of refunding firms can be created in advance of the quarterly earnings announcement that will generate abnormal returns around the earnings announcement. Because trading rules are inconsistent with the concept of an efficient capital market, these results constitute an anomaly.

The study investigates the information content of the foreign sensitive payment disclosures made during the Securities and Exchange Commission's ‘voluntary’ disclosure program. The results of the information content tests and the tests of the relationship between payment size and abnormal security returns imply that investors may have been reacting to the expectation of the loss of future business or to the possibility of future government sanctions.

This paper adds to recent evidence on market inefficiency in processing information in earnings reports. It documents that short positions taken in sample stocks which did not report earnings by the date expected during the sample period, 1971–1976, would have been abnormally profitable, before transaction costs. This is because late reports, on average, revealed bad news which was not anticipated in market prices prior to the report date. The magnitude of the average abnormal returns is in the order of 1.0% over 20 days but is larger for smaller firms in the sample and positively related to the length of the reporting delay. The paper also documents that long positions taken in stocks reporting early with good news would have generated abnormal returns of approximately 1.0% on average over a 20-day holding period.

This paper examines the association between one specific change in executive compensation contracts (adoption of performance plans), changes in corporate capital investment, and security market performance. The empirical results indicate that (when compared to similar non-adopting firms) firms adopting performance plans exhibit a significant growth in capital expenditures and a favorable security market reaction to the announcement of the performance plan adoption. These results provide evidence that changes in executive compensation contracts are associated with changes in managerial decisions.

The earnings ‘time-series literature’ in accounting focuses on the statistical characteristics of the processes which generate corporate earnings. In order to further our understanding of earnings behavior, this study investigates the question whether inter-firm differences in these statistical characteristics (autocorrelations and variances of earnings changes) can be explained by economic factors. Various relationships between economic factors and earnings behavior are derived from the economic literature and examined empirically in this study. Findings indicate that autocorrelations and variability of annual earnings and earnings over equity changes are systematically associated with the following factors: the type of product, the height of industry barriers-to-entry (a surrogate for degree of competition), the degree of capital intensity (‘operating leverage’), and the firm size.

In this paper, we review research into the economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory choices of accounting techniques and standards. We discuss how the predictions of extant economic consequence theories are driven by contracting and monitoring costs associated with management compensation contracts, bond covenants, regulation, and/or political visibility. We review empirical tests of economic consequence theories, categorize those tests, and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. The empirical tests reveal two systematic associations with accounting choice: size, a proxy for political visibility, and leverage, a proxy for contracting and monitoring costs of lending agreements. Interpretation of the results is difficult, due to general limitations of the tests. We conclude by suggesting some directions for future research, based on our analysis of the potential payoffs associated with different types of empirical tests.

Firm size has been used as a proxy for the firm's political costs and hence managers' proclivity to choose income reducing accounting procedures. This study provides additional evidence on this topic by examining the association between firm size and effective corporate tax rates. The latter are one component of a firm's political costs. The roughly fifty largest U.S. exchange-listed firms, in particular oil and gas companies and manufacturing firms, have significantly higher worldwide tax rates than other firms. These higher tax rates are observed primarily after the implementation of the U.S. 1969 Tax Reform Act and after the OPEC countries raised their tax rates on U.S. oil producers. The findings, which are insensitive to alternative sources of data, alternative measures of firm size, and alternative measures of effective tax rates, are consistent with the use in previous studies of firm size as a proxy for the firm's political costs.

This paper shows how the existence of disclosure-related costs offers an explanation for why a manager exercise discretion in disclsing information even though traders have rational expectations about his motivation to withhold unfavorable reports. In effect, disclosure-related costs introduce noise by extending the range of possible interpretations of withheld information to include news which is actually favorable. Therefore, traders are unable to interpret withheld information as unambiguously ‘bad new’ and thereby discount the value of the firm to the point that the manager is better served to disclose what he knows.

This study addresses the relationship between the supply of auditing in the public sector and political competition expected in future elections. Empirical tests that use cross-sectional data from state governments reveal positive correlations between state audit budgets and measures of political competition. These results are consistent with an argument that public officials' incentives to supply auditing arise from contracting between the officials and their supporting interests.