Knowledge that Transforms

This paper is designed to provide additional evidence on the positive theory of accounting policy choice by combining individual accounting principles into firm income strategies. These strategies were the dependent variable in a probit analysis where the independent variables were size, management compensation, industry concentration ratio, systematic risk, capital intensity and the total debt to total asset ratio. The results indicate that four of these factors (size, management compensation, concentration ratio, and the total debt to total asset ratio) have a significant association with the choice of a firm's income strategy. This test provides strong evidence consistent with the positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice. We also present evidence that smaller firms and/or firms in less concentrated industries do not appear to make accounting policy choice decisions that are consistent with this theory.

Portfolios are formed directly and exclusively upon residual return behavior in the months prior to portfolio formation. The empirical behavior of residual return in the post-formation period is then examined. Based upon the overall time period studied (1932 through 1977), the average residual return is essentially zero in the months subsequent to the portfolio formation. However, systematic (i.e., non-zero) residual behavior is observed in particular years. Moreover, the results suggest the possibility that ‘abnormal’ returns observed after certain events (e.g., earnings announcements) may at least in part reflect more general phenomena associated with being ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in terms of residual returns in the months previous to the event.

Regulators and small audit firms allege that audit firm size does not affect audit quality and therefore should be irrelevant in the selection of an auditor. Contrary to this view, the current paper argues that audit quality is not independent of audit firm size, even when auditors initially possesses identical technological capabilities. In particular, when incumbent auditors earn client-specific quasi-rents, auditors with a greater number of clients have ‘more to lose’ by failing to report a discovered breach in a particular client's records. This collateral aspect increases the audit quality supplied by larger audit firms. The implications for some recent recommendations of the AICPA Special Committee on Small and Medium Sized Firms are developed.

The impact that a firm's earnings releases have on the stock prices of other firms in its industry is examined. For an identifiable sub-set of firms, the results are consistent with a significant information transfer occurring between the earnings release firm and the other firms in its industry. This subset is identified by examining the impact of the release on the stock price of the announcing firm. The magnitude of this impact is more significant for a sample of firms which have a larger percentage of their revenues in the same line of business as the earnings release firm vis-á-vis a sample with a lower percentage of their revenues from the same line of business. Alternative interpretations of the empirical results are also discussed. The research findings have implications for information content and market efficiency research and for research on policy issues associated with disclosure regulation.

Until 1974, firms could choose, within GAAP, to capitalize or expense interest costs associated with capital expenditures. The predominant practice had been to treat interest as a period expense. However, in 1974, the Securities and Exchange Commission imposed a moratorium on further adoption of interest capitalization by non-regulated firms. This study empirically examines economic factors potentially influencing firms' decisions to expense or capitalize interest prior to the SEC moratorium. We hypothesize that the choice may be affected by (1) the existence of management compensation agreements tied to reported earnings, (2) debt covenant constraints, and (3) the political costs (for some firms) of reporting higher earnings. When compared to the control group, our findings are that (1) the frequency of explicit management compensation packages was not greater for the interest capitalization group, (2) firms with financial ratios closer to likely debt agreement constraints (on dividends, interest coverage, and leverage) tended to elect interest capitalization, and (3) other than the largest firms in the ‘politically sensitive’ petroleum refining industry, the larger firms were more likely to capitalize interest.