Knowledge that Transforms

Building on economic theories of cultural transmission, we examine how audit partners’ cultural trust influences audit outcomes. Based on the “presumptive doubt” perspective of professional skepticism, we propose that audit partners from trusting cultures are more likely to rely on management’s assertions, while still exercising a high degree of caution and not naively trusting management. Consistent with our prediction, we find that audit partners from trusting cultures commit fewer Type I errors when issuing going concern opinions, without significantly increasing Type II errors. The reduction in Type I errors is primarily found when audit partners normally tend to be more conservative, and it is attenuated when management is less trustworthy. At the same time, audit partners from trusting cultures are also associated with more within-GAAP earnings management, suggesting that increased trust entails a cost. Collectively, our findings offer new insights into how cultural trust affects the assurance of accounting information.

We examine the role of firms’ internal information quality (IIQ) in designing executive incentive contracts. We find that higher IIQ is associated with a greater number of performance metrics and increased dissimilarity from peer firms’ contracts, particularly along non-financial dimensions. These relations hold when we examine changes in IIQ that are likely induced by plausibly exogenous shifts in two financial accounting standards. We further find that incorporating more numerous and more dissimilar non-financial metrics is positively associated with future profitability, but only when IIQ is high. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the quality of a firm’s internal information is a friction in performance metric selection.

This paper investigates the effect of frictions in consumption taxes on firms' product mix decisions. We use a stacked difference-indifferences approach that exploits the staggered transition from a sales tax with the risk of tax cascading to a value added tax (VAT) with credits on inputs across states in India, as well as detailed data on listed manufacturing firms' production decisions. We find that the switch to a VAT system induces affected firms to narrow their product scope and to reduce vertical integration. That is, firms cut the internal production of input goods and instead focus their production on their best-performing products. Firms affected by the switch to VAT reduce their firm size and are more likely to outsource production of input goods. We also show that this vertical disintegration results in lower manufacturing costs, higher profitability and firm value, and increased investment efficiency for affected firms. Overall, the paper shows that alleviating frictions in sales tax or VAT systems can reduce investment and productivity distortions and improve the allocation of capital across firms.