We survey 344 buy-side analysts from 181 investment firms and conduct 16 detailed follow-up interviews to gain insights into the activities of buy-side analysts, including the determinants of their compensation, the inputs to their stock recommendations, their beliefs about financial reporting quality, and the role of sell-side analysts in buy-side research. One important finding is that 10-K or 10-Q reports are more useful than quarterly conference calls and management earnings guidance for determining buy-side analysts׳ stock recommendations. Our results also suggest that sell-side analysts add value by providing buy-side analysts with in-depth industry knowledge and access to company management.

Recent research shows that high return dispersion (RD) is associated with economic conditions characterized by high discount rates, which are not conducive to growth and investment. We propose that RD risk can explain the accrual and investment anomalies. We conduct asset-pricing tests that include RD as a potential risk factor and show that low-accrual and low-investment firms have significantly higher exposure to the risk captured by RD. RD significantly explains future returns and the excess returns to accrual and investment hedge portfolios shrink in magnitude and become insignificant during periods of low RD. We conclude that risk explains the accrual and investment anomalies.

Regulatory pressure to increase both audit committee financial expertise and board independence has resulted in lower status for audit committees relative to management. This status differential is relevant because expertise and relative status are important determinants of each party׳s ability to influence outcomes, particularly when parties face conflicting goals. We find that audit committees with both financial expertise and high relative status are associated with lower levels of earnings management, as measured by accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals. These results speak to benefits and limitations of financial expertise, which have been the focus of considerable debate.

Using the IPO setting, we test whether firms signal the quality of their investments in innovation activities by claiming R&D tax credits. We find the presence and amount of the R&D credit are each associated with lower information asymmetry and with higher investor demand at IPO. Conservatively, we estimate that sample firms realize additional IPO proceeds of 32–45 percent of their creditable R&D expenditures, indicating economically significant non-tax benefits associated with the R&D credit. We verify the R&D credit signal by showing its positive association with firms’ future patenting activity, patent citations, and post-IPO stock returns. Results from these tests are concentrated among firms limited in their ability to obtain tax benefits from R&D credits, consistent with the R&D credit providing nontax benefits as a signal of innovation investment quality.

The frequency and magnitude of restructuring charges have drawn the attention of various groups of users of accounting information. Prior studies on restructuring charges have focused on the market's response to the announcement of the charge. In contrast, we examine the charges from the perspective of financial analysts. We provide evidence that analysts expect declining performance for restructuring firms in the short run but possible improvement over the longer term. When we examine forecast errors in the year following the charge, we find evidence that the analysts’ accuracy has declined and, despite the downward revision, analysts are still optimistically biased.

The effect that voluntarily disclosed managers' earnings forecasts have on the security prices of the announcing firms and other firms in the same industry is examined. The results are consistent with information content in managers' forecasts and with information transfer between forecast firms and other firms in the industry. These inferences are drawn from firms' abnormal returns computed from single- and two-index pricing models - where the latter includes market and industry indexes. Interestingly, while a positive information transfer is evident with market model residuals, once industry cross-sectional covariation in firms' returns is removed, no directional relation is apparent.

We examine whether performance reporting leads to inconsistent enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In a sample of over 13,000 SEC enforcement actions, we show that SEC staff respond to performance-reporting pressures and file more enforcement actions in September, the final month of the SEC's fiscal year, than in any other month. The increase in case volume in September is not fully explained by staff filing more procedural cases or accelerating case filings. Instead, SEC staff pursue less complex cases and agree to more lenient financial and non-financial sanctions to increase case volume in September. We attempt to rule out alternative explanations for our results, including natural SEC workflow and resource constraints. Overall, our findings suggest that performance reporting creates agency conflicts that lead to regulatory inconsistency within the fiscal year.

We survey 462 financial journalists and conduct 18 interviews to obtain insights on the inputs to their reporting, the incentives they face, and the factors that influence their coverage decisions. We report many findings relevant to the accounting literature and identify multiple avenues for future research. For example, financial journalists say the likelihood they write about a specific company or CEO increases when the company is controversial or the CEO has a colorful personality, suggesting journalists gravitate toward provocative topics. We also find that financial journalists routinely use company-issued disclosures and private phone calls with company management when developing articles, and that they believe they are evaluated primarily on the accuracy, timeliness, and depth of their articles. Journalists also believe monitoring companies to hold them accountable is one of financial journalism's most important objectives, but they often face negative consequences for writing articles that portray companies in an unfavorable light.

Extant literature documents that aggregate accruals positively predict future market returns and attributes this relation to either changes in discount rates or systematic earnings management. We offer an alternative explanation: aggregate merger and acquisition (M&A) activity drives this relation. M&A activity affects the magnitude of accruals, which in turn drives the market return predictability of aggregate accruals. We find that the ability of both aggregate accruals and discretionary aggregate accruals (a measure of systematic earnings management) to predict market returns disappears after controlling for aggregate M&A activity. Furthermore, aggregate M&A activity predicts future market returns, consistent with a price response to improvements in macroeconomic outcomes due to aggregate M&A activity.

We find that firms grant more rank and file stock options when involved in financial reporting violations, consistent with managements’ incentives to discourage employee whistle-blowing. Violating firms grant more rank and file options during periods of misreporting relative to control firms and to their own option grants in non-violation years. Moreover, misreporting firms that grant more rank and file options during violation years are more likely to avoid whistle-blowing allegations. Although the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) offers financial rewards to encourage whistle-blowing, our findings suggest that firms discourage whistle-blowing by giving employees incentives to remain quiet about financial irregularities.