I study the joint choice of responsibility assignment, performance measures, and rewards for a two-stage process where the quality of the initial stage work affects the required final stage effort. By assigning responsibilities to give the initial stage agent an incentive to sabotage the final stage, output is made informative about this agent's attention to quality. I find conditions under which it is cost-effective to create and to contractually use such information. This analysis makes formal that the value of a performance measure is determined not simply by its congruity and precision but by its influence on the optimal organisational design

Two trade-offs arise in an agency relationship when the same accounting signal is used for both performance evaluation and investment evaluation. Using the signal for performance evaluation, (1) directly influences the informativeness of the signal for investment evaluation, (2) induces manipulation, which, in turn, lowers the informativeness of the signal for investment evaluation. The principal can increase her welfare by delegating the investment decision to the agent, setting up multiple control systems, or using the outcome of the investment for performance evaluation. We show the implications of using each alternative on incentive contracts, equilibrium effort, and manipulation levels.

We show that a model of undifferentiated price competition closely predicts US audit market concentration. Contracting practices, client size distributions and differences in auditor productivity jointly determine audit firms' market shares. In contrast to prior literature, neither quality differences nor economies of scale for larger firms are necessary in our model to explain audit market concentration.

This study tests predictions that pricing multiples on and incremental explanatory power of equity book value (net income) increase (decrease) as financial health decreases. Tests using a sample of 396 bankrupt firms and tests using a larger, pooled sample both yield inferences consistent with predictions. Findings are robust to inclusion of controls for industry, size, return-on-equity, and volatility of equity returns. Equity book value and net income multiples and incremental explanatory power vary predictably across three illustrative industries, selected based on the likely extent of unrecognized intangible assets.

A model of earnings, cash flows and accruals is developed assuming a random walk sales process, variable and fixed costs, and that the only accruals are accounts receivable and payable, and inventory. The model implies earnings better predict future operating cash flows than current operating cash flows and the difference varies with the operating cash cycle. Also, the model is used to predict serial and cross-correlations of each firm's series. The implications and predictions are tested on a 1337 firm sample over 1963–1992. Both earnings and cash flow forecast implications and correlation predictions are generally consistent with the data.

In a sample of auditor change firms we find that discretionary accruals are income decreasing during the last year with the predecessor auditor and generally insignificant during the first year with the successor. In addition, the income decreasing discretionary accruals are concentrated among firms expected to have greater litigation risk. These findings are consistent with litigation risk concerns providing incentives for auditors to prefer conservative accounting choices, and with managers dismissing incumbent auditors in the hope of finding a more reasonable successor. However, we cannot rule out financial distress as a potential alternative explanation for our results.

A large majority of firms employ negotiated transfer pricing, yet this method of decentralization remains largely unexplored. This study develops a model of negotiated transfer pricing incorporating private divisional information, as this is the setting where decentralization is most compelling. The firm designs a compensation system utilizing divisional performance evaluation and negotiated transfer pricing. A dynamic bargaining model is employed to capture managerial negotiations. The study demonstrates that the firm can design managerial-compensation schemes and bargaining infrastructures so that the negotiated transfer-pricing structure allows it to reach the upper bound on available profits.

This study examines the usefulness of an analyst-based valuation model in predicting cross-sectional stock returns. We estimate firms' fundamental values (V) using I/B/E/S consensus forecasts and a residual income model. We find that V is highly correlated with contemporaneous stock price, and that the V/P ratio is a good predictor of long-term cross-sectional returns. This effect is not explained by a firm's market beta, B/P ratio, or total market capitalization. In addition, we find errors in consensus analyst earnings forecasts are predictable, and that the predictive power of V/P can be improved by incorporating these errors.

Recent studies have provided theory and evidence that the contemporaneous relation between stock returns and accounting earnings is nonlinear, different for profits and losses, and different across firms. Since each factor can result from differences in earnings persistence, existing theory is ambiguous as to whether these factors are distinct or overlapping. Thus, we conduct a simultaneous examination. Our primary tests show that each factor explains a significant portion of the variance of returns after controlling for the other two factors, with firm-specific estimation providing the largest incremental explanatory power. Alternative tests produce similar conclusions. Empirically, the three factors are distinct.