This paper analyzes the effects of expanded compensation disclosures on manager pay. For identification, I use the introduction of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in the 2007 proxy season, a significant expansion in required compensation disclosures, to compare manager pay at firms with and without the disclosure in a difference-in-differences analysis. These disclosures are associated with increasing pay, contrary to the conventional wisdom that pay disclosures reduce pay levels via better shareholder monitoring. I hypothesize that enhanced ex ante disclosures of incentive plans reduce boards’ flexibility to make ex post adjustments or to use subjectivity and pressure boards toward more formulaic plans. Both effects impose higher payout risk on managers, leading to increased pay levels. Consistent with this hypothesis, the CD&A introduction is associated with lower likelihood to earn variable cash pay, greater use of formula-based pay, and higher pay at firms with more volatile measures of performance.

We combine U.S. Census data with SEC enforcement actions to examine employees' outcomes, such as wages and turnover, before, during, and after periods of fraudulent financial reporting. We find that fraud firms’ employees lose about 50% of cumulative annual wages, compared to a matched sample, and the separation rate is much higher after fraud periods. Yet, employment growth at fraud firms is positive during fraud periods; these firms overbuild and hire new, lower-paid employees concurrent with the fraud, unlike firms in distress which tend to contract. When the fraud is revealed, firms shed workers, unwinding this abnormal growth and resulting in most of the negative wage consequences. Wage outcomes are particularly unfavorable in thin labor markets, and lower-wage employees, though unlikely to have perpetrated the fraud, experience more severe wage losses compared to higher-wage employees.

We examine whether external assurance improves the quality of firms’ carbon accounting. We develop a measure of carbon accounting quality based on the deviation of reported emissions from a model-based expected level and supplement it with two survey-based measures. We show that assurance is associated with higher carbon accounting quality. This association is stronger when firms have weaker pre-existing carbon accounting systems and when assurance is more thorough. Consistent with assurance enhancing quality, assurance relates to the identification of issues in a firm’s carbon accounting system, along with fewer omissions and more revisions of prior disclosures. Exploiting mandated assurance for non-financial reporting in three E.U. countries, we show that firms experience post-regulation increases in carbon accounting quality. Together, the findings highlight the importance of assurance for reporting firms that are improving their carbon accounting quality.

Executive bonus plans often incorporate performance measures that exclude particular costs—a practice we refer to as “cost shielding.” We predict that boards use cost shielding to mitigate underinvestment and insulate new managers from the costs of prior executives’ decisions. We find evidence that boards use cost shielding to deter underinvestment in intangibles and encourage managers to take advantage of growth opportunities. We also find that cost shielding tends to be elevated for newly-hired executives, and decreases over tenure. Collectively, our results suggest that boards deliberately choose performance metrics that alleviate agency conflicts.