This paper examines the economic consequences of a regulatory change mandating OTCBB firms to comply with reporting requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. This change substantially increases mandated disclosures for firms previously not filing with the SEC. We document that the imposition of disclosure requirements results in significant costs for smaller firms, forcing them off the OTCBB. SEC regulation also has significant benefits. Firms previously filing with the SEC experience positive stock returns and permanent increases in liquidity, suggesting positive externalities from disclosure regulation. Newly Compliant firms exhibit significant increases in liquidity consistent with improved disclosure reducing information asymmetry.

We use corporate jet flight patterns to identify private meetings with investors that are ex ante unobservable to non-participants. Using approximately 400,000 flights, we proxy for private meetings with “roadshows,” defined as three-day windows that include flights to money centers and to non-money centers in which the firm has high institutional ownership. Roadshows exhibit greater abnormal stock reactions, analyst forecast activity, and absolute changes in local institutional ownership than other flight activity. We also find positive trading gains in firms with more complex information and infrequent private meetings, suggesting that roadshows provide participating investors an advantage over non-participating investors.

Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., “open” conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision to provide open calls is associated with the composition of a firm's investor base and, to some degree, the complexity of its financial information. We also find that open calls are associated with a greater increase in small trades (consistent with individuals trading on information released during the call) and higher price volatility during the call period.