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Do accountants make better chief financial officers?

Journal of Accounting and Economics 2016 61(2-3), 414-432
We examine whether chief financial officers (CFOs) with accounting backgrounds (accountant CFOs) are associated with more conservative corporate outcomes. We find that, in high-growth industries, firms with accountant CFOs invest less in research and development and capital expenditures and are less likely to engage in external financing. In low-growth industries, we find that firms with accountant CFOs exhibit greater cost efficiency. Our results are consistent with risk aversion on the part of accountant CFOs. We further document that accountant CFOs are negatively associated with firm value in high-growth industries and positively associated with firm value in low-growth industries.

The activities of buy-side analysts and the determinants of their stock recommendations

Journal of Accounting and Economics 2016 62(1), 139-156
We survey 344 buy-side analysts from 181 investment firms and conduct 16 detailed follow-up interviews to gain insights into the activities of buy-side analysts, including the determinants of their compensation, the inputs to their stock recommendations, their beliefs about financial reporting quality, and the role of sell-side analysts in buy-side research. One important finding is that 10-K or 10-Q reports are more useful than quarterly conference calls and management earnings guidance for determining buy-side analysts׳ stock recommendations. Our results also suggest that sell-side analysts add value by providing buy-side analysts with in-depth industry knowledge and access to company management.

Rank and file employees and the discovery of misreporting: The role of stock options

Journal of Accounting and Economics 2016 62(2-3), 277-300
We find that firms grant more rank and file stock options when involved in financial reporting violations, consistent with managements’ incentives to discourage employee whistle-blowing. Violating firms grant more rank and file options during periods of misreporting relative to control firms and to their own option grants in non-violation years. Moreover, misreporting firms that grant more rank and file options during violation years are more likely to avoid whistle-blowing allegations. Although the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) offers financial rewards to encourage whistle-blowing, our findings suggest that firms discourage whistle-blowing by giving employees incentives to remain quiet about financial irregularities.