Armstrong et al. (2022) review the empirical methods used in the accounting literature to draw causal inferences. They document a growing number of studies using quasi-experimental methods and provide a critical perspective on this trend as well as the use of these methods in the accounting literature. In this discussion, I complement their review by broadening the perspective. I argue for a design-based approach to accounting research that shifts attention from methods to the entire research design. I also discuss why studies that aim to draw causal inferences are important, how these studies fit into the scientific process, and why assessing the strength of the research design is important when evaluating studies and aggregating research findings.

This paper discusses evidence on the costs of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) from stock returns and going-private decisions. Zhang, [2007. Economic consequences of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Journal of Accounting and Economics, doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.07.002] analyzes returns around legislative events and concludes that SOX imposes significant costs on firms. Engel, et al. [2007. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and firms’ going-private decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.02.002] examine going-private decisions and point to unintended consequences. Both studies are carefully conducted and deserve praise for tackling an important issue. However, as my discussion highlights, several key findings may not be attributable to SOX and we should exercise caution in interpreting the evidence. While it is not implausible that one-size-fits-all regulation imposes substantial costs on firms, we presently do not have much SOX-related evidence to support this conclusion.

Lang, Raedy and Wilson (henceforth LRW) (2006) compare the properties of U.S. GAAP accounting numbers across cross-listed and U.S. firms. Using a wide range of properties, LRW show that accounting data are not comparable, even though sample firms use the same accounting standards. I discuss how these findings advance the literature and what they imply for the effectiveness of cross listing as a bonding mechanism. My discussion highlights that documented differences cannot be solely attributed to weak U.S. legal enforcement. I emphasize that accounting standards provide discretion and that cross-listed and U.S. firms are likely to have differential incentives to use this discretion. To illustrate, I document that cross-listed and U.S. firms differ in ownership concentration and that these differences are associated with the level of earnings management. I also provide evidence that home-country institutions continue to influence cross-listed firms’ reporting behavior.

We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark that is largely attributable to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative abnormal returns when going dark. We find that many firms go dark due to poor future prospects, distress and increased compliance costs after SOX. But we also find evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor protection are weak. Finally, we show that going dark and going private are distinct economic events.

This paper examines the economic consequences of a regulatory change mandating OTCBB firms to comply with reporting requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. This change substantially increases mandated disclosures for firms previously not filing with the SEC. We document that the imposition of disclosure requirements results in significant costs for smaller firms, forcing them off the OTCBB. SEC regulation also has significant benefits. Firms previously filing with the SEC experience positive stock returns and permanent increases in liquidity, suggesting positive externalities from disclosure regulation. Newly Compliant firms exhibit significant increases in liquidity consistent with improved disclosure reducing information asymmetry.

We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe's regulation, we find that forcing firms to disclose financial statements reduces the number of innovating firms and the average firm's innovation spending, but it does not reduce industry-wide total innovation spending. Our results suggest that the regulation imposes proprietary costs on firms, which discourages innovation activity, especially by smaller firms. We also show that the regulation provides positive information spillovers to other firms (e.g., competitors, suppliers, and customers), especially larger ones. We complement our analysis with alternative innovation measures, including patents, and corroborate the results with an analysis of reporting changes due to an enforcement reform in Germany. In sum, the European reporting regulation has aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation. Importantly, it appears to concentrate innovative activities among fewer, mostly larger firms, which could reflect institutional features of our setting or more general economic forces.

In recent years, reporting under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became mandatory in many countries. The capital-market effects around this change have been extensively studied, but their sources are not yet well understood. This study aims to distinguish between several potential explanations for the observed capital-market effects. We find that, across all countries, mandatory IFRS reporting had little impact on liquidity. The liquidity effects around IFRS introduction are concentrated in the European Union (EU) and limited to five EU countries that concurrently made substantive changes in reporting enforcement. There is little evidence of liquidity benefits in IFRS countries without substantive enforcement changes even when they have strong legal and regulatory systems. Moreover, we find similar liquidity effects for firms that experience enforcement changes but do not concurrently switch to IFRS. Thus, changes in reporting enforcement or (unobserved) factors associated with these changes play a critical role for the observed liquidity benefits after mandatory IFRS adoption. In contrast, the change in accounting standards seems to have had little effect on market liquidity.