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Customer concentration risk and the cost of equity capital

Journal of Accounting and Economics 2016 61(1), 23-48
This study investigates the relation between customer concentration and a supplier׳s cost of equity capital. We hypothesize that a more concentrated customer base increases a supplier׳s risk, which results in a higher cost of equity. Our results show a positive association between customer concentration and a supplier׳s cost of equity, and this relation is more pronounced for suppliers that are more likely to lose major customers or that are more prone to larger losses if they lose such customers. Further, results from a propensity score matched sample analysis and instrumental variables regressions imply that our findings are robust to accounting for endogeneity. We also provide evidence that a supplier with a concentrated base of safer government customers has a lower cost of equity. Finally, we document a positive relation between corporate customer concentration and a supplier’s cost of debt. Overall, our findings suggest that the composition and concentration of a supplier’s customer base significantly impact its financing costs.

Shared auditors in mergers and acquisitions

Journal of Accounting and Economics 2016 61(1), 49-76
We examine the impact of shared auditors, defined as audit firms that provide audit services to a target and its acquirer firm prior to an acquisition, on transaction outcomes. We find shared auditors are observed in nearly a quarter of all public acquisitions and targets are more likely to receive a bid from a firm that has the same auditor. Moreover, these shared auditor deals are associated with significantly lower deal premiums, lower target event returns, higher bidder event returns, and higher deal completion rates. These results are driven by bids in which targets and acquirers share the same practice office of an audit firm and in which the target is small. Overall, our evidence suggests that bidders benefit from sharing an auditor with the target. Our results are robust to controls for alternative explanations and for selection bias in the shared-auditor effect.