We document that tax considerations influence whether and when a firm withdraws excess assets in its defined benefit pension plan through a reversion. Since a reversion impacts taxable income over many years and alternative methods of withdrawing excess assets exist, we argue that the economically relevant tax-based decision criterion is its ‘differential tax benefit’, defined as the difference between the discounted tax savings of reversion versus those of the best alternative withdrawal method. We develop a technique for directly estimating this decision criterion and document that differential tax benefits are strongly correlated with the reversion decision and its timing.

This study analyses the relation between cash compensation of bank CEOs and accounting earnings from selected discretionary transactions. Results indicate that income from discreationary transactions accompanied by cash flow effects is reflected in the CEO compensation function. There is no reliable indication that income from discreationary transactions unaccompanied by cash flows affects compensation. The impact of discreationary earnings on the compensation function varies as a function of firms' ‘nonperforming loans’. We interpret nonperforming loans as a proxy for the firm's future capital position. There is no support for a tax-based explanation for the link between compensation and discreationary earnings.

This paper investigates the extent of intra-industry information transfers associated with the half-yearly earnings announcements of a sample of Australian firms. The ‘omitted factor’ interpretation of Foster's (1981) results is examined using a recursive systems specification of the return generating process to model extra-market return covariation in cross-section. Although some aspects of the results do appear sensitive to the alternative methodologies, the overall conclusion is consistent with Foster (1981) and supports the existence of intra-industry information transfers associated with firms' earnings releases.

We show harmonizing domestic GAAP with foreign GAAP can have deleterious effects on security market performance, specifically price informativeness and trading volume. Harmonization effects result from interaction between two forces. Direct informational effects depend on whether harmonization increases or decreases GAAP precision. Expertise acquisition effects depend on benefits and costs to foreign investors of becoming domestic GAAP experts. These countervailing forces can result in harmonization to more (less) precise GAAP increasing (decreasing) or, unexpectedly, decreasing (increasing) price informativeness and trading volume. We also observe this for a cost of capital metric. Thus, harmonization is not necessarily a desirable singular goal.