This paper presents additional evidence on the relation between the investment opportunity set and financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Our results are based on a sample of 237 growth firms and 237 nongrowth firms. We find that growth firms have significantly lower debt/equity ratios and exhibit significantly lower dividend yields than nongrowth firms. We also find that growth firms pay significantly higher levels of cash compensation to their executives and have a significantly higher incidence of stock option plans than nongrowth firms. However, controlling for firm size, the incidence of bonus plans, performance plans, and restricted stock plans does not differ between growth and nongrowth samples.

We extend Healy (1985) by examining the relation between discretionary accruals and bonus plan bounds for a sample of 102 firms for the 1980–1990 period. Contrary to Healy, we find that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the lower bound, managers select income-increasing discretionary accruals (and vice versa). We believe that our results are more consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis than with Healy's bonus hypothesis. However, mechanical selection bias in portfolio formation cannot be entirely ruled out as an alternative explanation for our results.

We analyze the loss-reserving practices of 562 insurance companies in 1993 to assess the relation between client influence and auditor oversight. Consistent with Petroni [1992. Management's response to the differential costs and benefits of optimistic reporting in the property-casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15, 485–508.], we find that financially struggling insurers tend to under-reserve. However, this behavior is attenuated when the weak insurer is important to the local practice office of the auditor. This result holds across various measures of client influence and supports the contention of Reynolds and Francis [2001. Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting divisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30, 375–400.] that auditors allow less accounting discretion to their larger clients.

We report that insurance firms manage loss reserves to avoid violating certain test ratio bounds (known as IRIS ratios) that are used by regulators for solvency assessment. In our sample, almost two-thirds of the firms that would violate four or more IRIS ratios successfully adjust reserves to reduce the reported number of violations to less than four. This finding is significant because four violations usually trigger regulatory intervention. Our results indicate that non-earnings goals are an important influence on discretionary accounting choice. They also suggest that reserve manipulation can postpone needed regulatory intervention, sometimes for an extended period.