Prior studies have identified systematic and time persistent differences in analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, but have not explained why the differences exist. Using the I/B/E/S Detail History database, this study finds that forecast accuracy is positively associated with analysts’ experience (a surrogate for analyst ability and skill) and employer size (a surrogate for resources available), and negatively associated with the number of firms and industries followed by the analyst (measures of task complexity). The results suggest that analysts’ characteristics may be useful in predicting differences in forecasting performance, and that market expectations studies may be improved by modeling these characteristics.

Considerable debate exists about what analyst experience measures and whether analysts learn from their experiences. Extant research has argued that once innate ability is considered, analysts’ general and firm-specific experiences are not relevant to understanding their forecasting performance. We argue that measures of experience need to be expanded to also include task-specific experience. Our results reveal that analysts’ forecast accuracy is associated with both their innate ability and task-specific experience. In addition, we find that forecast accuracy and task-specific experience are most highly correlated for those analysts who survive the longest and, thus, presumably have the greatest innate abilities.

We investigate analysts' use of stock returns and other analysts' forecast revisions in revising their own forecasts after an earnings announcement. We find that analysts respond more strongly to these signals when the signals are more informative about future earnings changes. Although analysts underreact to these signals on average, we find that analysts who are most sensitive to signal informativeness achieve superior forecast accuracy relative to their peers and have a greater influence on the market. The results suggest that the ability to extract information from the actions of others serves as one source of analyst expertise.

Investor relations officers (IROs) play a central role in corporate communications with Wall Street. We survey 610 IROs at U.S. public companies and conduct 14 follow-up interviews to deepen our understanding of the role of IROs in corporate disclosure events. Three important themes emerge from our results: (i) the value, nature, and timing of private communication between IROs, analysts, and investors; (ii) the significant influence IROs have on corporate disclosures; and (iii) the degree of “theater” involved in public earnings conference calls, even the Q&A portion. We provide insights into the investor relations, analyst, institutional investor, and disclosure literatures.

We survey 344 buy-side analysts from 181 investment firms and conduct 16 detailed follow-up interviews to gain insights into the activities of buy-side analysts, including the determinants of their compensation, the inputs to their stock recommendations, their beliefs about financial reporting quality, and the role of sell-side analysts in buy-side research. One important finding is that 10-K or 10-Q reports are more useful than quarterly conference calls and management earnings guidance for determining buy-side analysts׳ stock recommendations. Our results also suggest that sell-side analysts add value by providing buy-side analysts with in-depth industry knowledge and access to company management.