Beyer et al. (2010) review the financial reporting literature related to voluntary and mandatory firm disclosures, and sell-side analyst reports. The discussion summarizes their approach, highlights some of their main conclusions, and presents alternative ideas about promising avenues for future research.

Lending concentration features prominently in models of information acquisition by banks, but empirical evidence on its role is limited. Using bank-level loan exposures, we find banks are less likely to collect audited financial statements from firms in industries and regions in which they have more exposure. These findings are stronger in settings in which adverse selection is acute and muted when the bank lacks experience with an exposure. Our results offer novel evidence on how bank characteristics are related to the type of financial information they use and support theoretical predictions suggesting portfolio concentration reveals a bank's relative expertise.

We study the decision to fund R&D through a separate financing organization (an ‘RDFO’) that takes the form of either a limited partnership or a corporation. The RDFO offers tax and financial reporting benefits. As a form of external funding, it also creates moral hazard and adverse selection problems (information costs). Using convertible debt as a comparative form of external funding, we find that debt-related (but not equity-related) financial reporting benefits affect the decision to form RDFOs, the evidence is mixed on whether taxes influence the formation decision, and the information costs of RDFOs restrict their use.