Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital (VC) firm׳s reputation is affected when it fails to prevent fraud in its portfolio companies. We find that reputation-damaged VCs interact differently in the future with their limited partners, other VCs, and IPO underwriters because they are perceived as ineffective monitors. In addition, VCs that fail to prevent fraud experience greater difficulty in taking future portfolio companies public.

Recent research suggesting that shareholders demand conservative financial reporting raises the question: Which shareholders demand conservatism? We find that higher ownership by institutions that are likely to monitor managers is associated with more conservative financial reporting. This positive association is more pronounced among firms with more growth options and higher information asymmetry, where direct monitoring is more difficult and the potential governance benefits of conservatism are greater. Further, lead-lag tests of the direction of causality suggest that ownership by monitoring institutions leads to more conservative reporting, rather than the reverse. Collectively, these results are consistent with monitoring institutions demanding conservatism.

We find that suppliers are more likely to redact mandated disclosures when major customers have proprietary information to protect (in the form of R&D intensity, trade secrets, and nondisclosure agreements), controlling for suppliers' own proprietary cost concerns. Furthermore, the effect on suppliers' redactions is concentrated in subsamples for which customers have greater power, measured by customer size, industry leadership, and the number of suppliers. Additionally, suppliers also curtail operations-related disclosures in the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) and product- and service-related press releases when customers likely have proprietary information to protect. Overall, these findings suggest that dependent suppliers internalize their customers' disclosure incentives and curtail disclosures, catering to customers’ demand for information protection.

Despite the unquestionable influence of conservatism, disagreement remains about what economic demands lead to financial reporting conservatism. Research examining lenders’ demands for reporting conservatism has been questioned for ignoring conservative contract modifications. We document that these modifications exist but are not ubiquitous. We find contract modifications are more likely when agency costs are higher and litigation, tax and equity demands for conservatism are lower. However, we find a positive association between unexplained reporting conservatism and contract modifications, suggesting contractual modifications alone do not fulfill lenders’ demands for conservatism.

We examine how the market power of credit rating agencies (CRAs) affects their rating standards. Using a global sample across 26 countries from 1994 to 2019, we find that greater market power of global CRAs, measured by their country-level market shares, is associated with stricter corporate ratings. In addition, the increase in global CRAs' market shares contributes to the tightening trend in their credit ratings worldwide. Exploiting the NRSRO designation of local CRAs in Japan, we find that global CRAs issue more inflated ratings following a decline in their market power. Further, global CRAs' greater market power is associated with timelier ratings, fewer missed defaults, but more false warnings. Collectively, our findings suggest that global rating agencies' market power leads to stricter rating standards and timelier ratings by strengthening the agencies’ reputation concerns, but at the expense of increased false warnings.

We examine quantitative investors’ ability to navigate a common and occasionally material change to the financial data generating process: new accounting standards. Returns of quantitative mutual funds temporarily decrease relative to funds that rely more heavily on human discretion following the implementation of a few standards that significantly change key financial statement variables; however, other standards do not appear to have a differential effect. Our result is stronger for quantitative funds using more accounting terminology in their prospectuses and using value strategies, which leverage accounting signals. Excess portfolio turnover following the implementation of accounting standards appears to be a driving factor of the quant underperformance. Additional evidence connects the fund-level results to the specific stocks that were affected by the accounting standards. Overall, our results suggest quant funds are generally proficient at adapting to accounting changes, although material changes occasionally put them at a temporary disadvantage relative to discretionary investors.

This discussion makes several observations regarding the past 25 years of China-related accounting research reviewed in Lennox and Wu (2022). First, we discuss factors of supply and demand that led to the rise of China-related studies and how this growth has contributed to the internationalization of accounting research. We note that the taxonomy of the literature by geographic region rather than topic or methodology is unusual and makes it difficult to formulate a common framework that would help organize the many contributions. Next, we distill distinct patterns in authorship, choice of topics, and asserted contributions of China-related studies. Studies are increasingly shaped by the availability of new data and regulatory reforms. These features should be interpreted carefully, as most reforms are interconnected and reflect the purposeful outcome of a tightly controlled economy. As a result, issues of generalizability arise. Alternatively, researchers could embrace the China setting and strive to identify the local institutional forces that make it special. We see such a more institutional, context-specific view of China-related—or better—international research as an opportunity for the field. We close by presenting five broad themes we view as promising areas for future China-related research.

We examine whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program improves audit quality for a sample of non-US-listed foreign public client companies from 55 countries audited by foreign (i.e., non-US) auditors. For a sample of non-US-listed clients of PCAOB-registered foreign auditors, we find that initial PCAOB inspections improve audit quality, over and above the threat of such inspections, for foreign auditors’ non-US-listed foreign clients. Our findings document the benefits of PCAOB international inspections for foreign investors in non-US-listed foreign companies which could increase the acceptability of the PCAOB international inspection program abroad.

We investigate how high-profile accounting frauds affect peer firms' investment. We document that peers react to the fraudulent reports by increasing investment during fraud periods. We show that this finding is not driven by frauds that have a higher ex ante likelihood of detection or by an association between fraud and investment booms. In addition, we find that peers’ investments increase in fraudulent earnings overstatements, and in industries with higher investor sentiment, lower cost of capital and higher private benefits of control. We also find evidence consistent with equity analysts potentially facilitating the spillover effect.