Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines information transfer regarding how investors react to new foreign macroeconomic and industry-related information embedded in foreign firms' earnings releases. Using non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. as our main setting, we find that U.S. investors react significantly to foreign macroeconomic information and to information generated by the interaction between macroeconomic and industry-related information. We also find that the benefits (costs) of processing earnings reports increase (decrease) both types of information transfers. In addition, we find macroeconomic information transfers in an international cross-listing setting and both types of information transfers in an international non-cross-listing setting.

This study examines changes in SEC enforcement and firm cooperation after the SEC introduced its new cooperation program in 2010. While previous research shows that the SEC penalized cooperative firms prior to 2010, our results suggest that after that year, it rewarded cooperation, especially good faith actions. We also find that after 2010, the SEC increased mentions of cooperation in public speeches and publicized more details about firm cooperative activities in AAERs. Finally, we find some evidence that misconduct firms increased good faith cooperation after the SEC revised its cooperation program in 2010. Our findings suggest that having a more explicit leniency program improves its effectiveness.

We use large increases in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to study the effects of expected retaliation costs on employee whistleblowing. Increases in UI benefits reduce the costs that arise from a job loss, one of the costliest forms of retaliation. We find that increases in UI benefits increase the number of facility-level employee workplace safety complaints filed with the regulator. Furthermore, UI benefit increases also result in more violations and more penalties. The effects are concentrated in firms where retaliation is more likely as measured by weaker employee relations, internal controls, and monitoring. Our findings show the importance of reducing retaliation costs to tap into employees’ knowledge of misconduct.

In the setting of defined-benefit pension liabilities, we hypothesize that equity and debt investors value these liabilities differently. As expected, we find that investors' valuations of equity more closely align with a going concern perspective that emphasizes the long-term funding needs of pension plans. In contrast, as expected, we find that investors' pricing of short-term and unsecured debt more closely aligns with a settlement perspective that emphasizes pension termination costs. For both equity and debt securities, the settlement (going concern) perspective dominates for short-duration (long-duration) pensions. Overall, our evidence suggests that equity and debt investors perceive complex liabilities in predictably different ways that are consistent with their differing information demands, which in turn vary with the characteristics of the obligation.

In about 20%–30% of cases where an analyst revises two outputs (namely, earnings estimates, target prices, or stock recommendations) simultaneously, the two estimates are revised in opposite directions. Existing literature notes that these inconsistent outputs are widespread, and concludes that they are lower-quality, driven by strategic bias, and are viewed as less valid by investors. We find that these characterizations are generally inaccurate. Apparent inconsistency is largely driven by accounting and economic factors, with only limited evidence that investment banking-related conflicts play a role. Moreover, inconsistent outputs are neither less accurate than consistent outputs nor do they resolve less investor uncertainty upon their release. Overall, our results suggest that researchers should be cautious in interpreting the correlation between analyst outputs as a measure of bias or quality, and in using a single analyst output as a proxy for an analyst's overall views.

We examine whether SEC effort to review state sponsors of terrorism (SST) disclosure negatively influences financial reporting oversight. Using comment letter inquiries about SST to measure effort, we find the likelihood that the SEC fails to identify a financial reporting error increases when comment letters reference SST. Consistent with SST disclosure review crowding out financial reporting oversight, comment letters referencing SST are less likely to mention accounting, non-GAAP, and MD&A issues. These effects are unique to SST as we find comment letter references to non-SST issues complement financial reporting oversight. Data obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request reveals a temporal shift in the occupational mix of SEC reviewers towards (away from) lawyers (accountants) that coincides with an increased focus on SST. Path analysis reveals that accountants (lawyers) are more (less) likely to detect errors and comment on financial reporting topics, with an indirect path through SST exacerbating these effects.

I study how private communication among competitors affects their public disclosures. Theory suggests that competing firms can use public disclosure to coordinate, and predicts less public disclosure when there is more private communication. Using data on strategic alliances, I predict and find that firms that enter strategic alliances with competitors reduce their public disclosure, and that the reduction is more pronounced for alliances that allow for more private communication.

How do firms protect their human capital? We test whether firms facing an increased threat of being acquired strengthen their antitakeover provisions (ATPs) in order to bond with their employees. We use the adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts, which exogenously decreases knowledge-worker mobility, thus elevating takeover risk and reducing employee incentives to innovate. Firms respond to the IDD adoption by strengthening ATPs that defend against hostile takeovers, especially when they have greater ex-ante employee mobility and human capital and place greater importance on employee relations. We find no evidence that managers strengthen ATPs for entrenchment or takeover bargaining purposes in this setting. Our findings show that ATPs can be used to credibly commit to employees in order to protect long-term value creation.

We discuss “Economic Consequences of Mandatory Auditor Reporting to Bank Regulators” by Balakrishnan, De George, Ertan, and Scobie (BDES, in this issue). BDES concludes that a key benefit of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators is reduced bank risk, and its costs include reduced profitability from less overall and less risky lending, and higher audit costs. BDES also provides evidence on the channels through which mandatory auditor reporting links to reduced bank risk. We scrutinize BDES's analyses and inferences and suggest additional analyses to improve and deepen them. Most notably, we caution that effective bank regulation entails reducing risk for riskier banks; risk reduction for safer banks suggests regulatory overreach. Our evidence is more indicative of regulatory overreach. Thus, although BDES is an important step forward in understanding the role auditors can and do play in improving information available to key decision-makers other than through auditor reports on financial statements and internal controls, a comprehensive assessment of whether the benefits of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators exceed its costs is left for future research. Such an assessment is necessary before concluding whether mandatory auditor reporting leads to more effective bank regulation or regulatory overreach.

An extensive stream of literature investigates how product market competition, by increasing the proprietary costs of disclosure, influences corporate disclosure policy. We hypothesize that the proprietary costs incurred by firms are associated with how a disclosure is framed and structured. We predict and find that the intensity of competition in the product market is associated with more negative and uncertain earnings conference calls. We also find evidence of firms “casting calls” by emphasizing more pessimistic analysts’ questions. Our results are robust to matched analyses on cash flow uncertainty and to examining the casting of analysts, as opposed to their questions, on the earnings call. Finally, we find consistent results using alternative measures of linguistic structure and in an alternative channel of disclosure with an alternative measure of linguistic framing. Our results demonstrate that firms attempt to mitigate proprietary costs by managing discretionary disclosure structure and framing their conference calls.