Knowledge that Transforms

Performance pricing links bank debt interest rate spreads to a borrower's performance via two options. Interest-decreasing performance pricing reduces spreads if credit quality improves. It is more common when prepayment is more likely or costly and when adverse selection costs are higher, and is less common when multiple performance measures better predict credit quality. Interest-increasing performance pricing increases spreads if credit quality deteriorates. It is more common when lenders reduce interest rates to add this provision, when downgrades are more likely, and when moral hazard costs are higher. We find lower spreads for contracts with interest increasing performance pricing.

Bayesian learning implies decreasing weights on prior beliefs and increasing weights on the accuracy of the analyst's past forecast record, as the number of forecast errors comprising her forecast record (its length) increases. Consistent with this model of investor learning, empirical tests show that investors’ reactions to forecast news are increasing in the product of the accuracy and length of analysts’ forecast records. Moreover, the Bayesian learning predicted by our model is more descriptive of investor reactions than is a static model which predicts that investors’ responses condition only on the prior accuracy of the analyst.

This paper analyzes the impact of signal-to-noise-ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal's welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation. We consider the impact of changes in the persistent, transitory, and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting. Increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation, but not for contracting. Eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation, but not necessarily for contracting. We discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns.

Besides the commonly cited reasons for the use of stock options, including motivating employees, conserving cash, exploiting favorable accounting and tax treatment, and retaining managers, we demonstrate a complementary benefit of option-based compensation: options also prove efficient in matching managerial pay to ability. Options are useful because they force a manager to put his pay on the line. If a manager wants to overstate his worth to the firm, he must naturally also overstate the firm's worth with him at the helm. As a result, the firm offers a generous package of stock options in lieu of cash for assertions of high ability. Since both the likelihood of option exercise and firm value in the event of exercise are tied to managerial ability, only a gifted manager takes such a gamble.

This paper extends the work of Sloan (1996. The Accounting Review 71, 289) by linking accrual reliability to earnings persistence. We construct a model showing that less reliable accruals lead to lower earnings persistence. We then develop a comprehensive balance sheet categorization of accruals and rate each category according to the reliability of the underlying accruals. Empirical tests generally confirm that less reliable accruals lead to lower earnings persistence and that investors do not fully anticipate the lower earnings persistence, leading to significant security mispricing. These results suggest that there are significant costs associated with incorporating less reliable accrual information in financial statements.

We examine the specification and power of tests based on performance-matched discretionary accruals, and make comparisons with tests using traditional discretionary accrual measures (e.g., Jones and modified-Jones models). Performance matching on return on assets controls for the effect of performance on measured discretionary accruals. The results suggest that performance-matched discretionary accrual measures enhance the reliability of inferences from earnings management research when the hypothesis being tested does not imply that earnings management will vary with performance, or where the control firms are not expected to have engaged in earnings management.

We investigate whether investors price accruals quality, our proxy for the information risk associated with earnings. Measuring accruals quality (AQ) as the standard deviation of residuals from regressions relating current accruals to cash flows, we find that poorer AQ is associated with larger costs of debt and equity. This result is consistent across several alternative specifications of the AQ metric. We also distinguish between accruals quality driven by economic fundamentals (innate AQ) versus management choices (discretionary AQ). Both components have significant cost of capital effects, but innate AQ effects are significantly larger than discretionary AQ effects.

Following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, self-regulated peer reviews at accounting firms were replaced by independent inspections conducted by the Public Company Accounting and Oversight Board. Critics of self-regulation had argued that the peer review program lacked credibility. This paper tests whether the opinions issued by the peer reviewers provided credible information to clients about audit firm quality. We find audit firms gained clients after receiving clean opinions from their reviewers and lost clients after receiving modified or adverse opinions. This suggests peer review opinions provided credible information about quality differences between audit firms.