This paper captures banks’ dynamic response to depositor discipline. Recognizing that the price and quantity response of uninsured deposits in the face of deteriorating fundamentals needs to be modeled as an endogenous process, we investigate how depositor discipline constrains banks’ behavior by extracting the impact of an exogenous rise in interest rates on the quantity of uninsured deposits. We find that good banks can raise uninsured deposits by raising their price, while weak banks cannot. This suggests that depositor discipline not only raises the cost of choosing a higher level of risk but also may, at very high levels of risk, effectively constrain bank managers’ behavior.

This paper examines the impact on the liquidity of NYSE/AMEX listed stocks when they were subsequently listed on the London or the Tokyo Stock Exchanges. It can be argued that the increased competition from foreign market makers will reduce the monopoly rents that specialists can earn, thereby improving their quotes. We find, however, that spreads do not decrease following a dual listing, though the depth of the quotes increases as predicted. The apparent increase in depth disappears once we account for changes in price, volume and return variance. We also find that the level of informed trading increases, which increases the cost to the specialist of providing liquidity, and explains why spreads do not decline in spite of increased competition. Consistent with an increase in informed trading, we also document an increase in trading activity.

This paper proposes a new measure of contagion as the coincidence of large left-tail events in the idiosyncratic disturbances of international stock returns after controlling for their exposure to a global factor. Episodes of bad contagion, especially those involving a large number of countries, are followed by a significant drop in international stock returns. This predictability pattern can be understood as an international transmission effect, as bad contagion only affects countries that did not experience tail events. In addition, the negative effect of bad contagion spills over to real growth, sovereign default risk, and financial stability indicators.